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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Americans have always been a religious people, and American Protestant Christianity has 
always been an important part of their lives. In the post-9/11 period, however, thanks largely 
to the remarks made by George W. Bush, and most evangelicals and fundamentalists who 
supported him, it became much more vocal in the international scene. Secularists throughout 
the world shivered with the fear that the most powerful country in the world is falling into the 
hands of religious radicals. Liberals and moderate conservatives in America panicked at the 
site of the growing political power of the evangelicals. In short, everybody was concerned. 
This piece investigates the roots of religiosity in the United States, and the state of the 
religious right in American politics in the post-September 11 era. 
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                                                    ÖZET 
 
Amerikalılar hep dindar bir halk olmuşlardır ve Amerikan Protestanlığı da daima hayatlarının 
önemli bir parçası olmuştur. Ne var ki  Protestanlık, 11 Eylül sonrası dönemde, büyük ölçüde 
George W. Bush ve çoğunluğu onu destekleyen evangelistler ve köktenciler sayesinde 
uluslararası sahnede sesini duyurmaya başladı. Bu gelişme, tüm dünyadaki sekülerleri, 
dünyanın en güçlü ülkesinin köktencilerin eline düştüğü korkusuyla titretti. Amerika’daki 
liberaller ve ılımlı muhafazakarlar, evangelistlerin büyüyen gücü karşısında paniğe kapıldılar. 
Kısacası, herkes endişe içindeydi. 
  Bu çalışma, Amerika’daki dindarlığın köklerini ve dindar sağın 11 Eylül sonrası 
dönemde Amerikan politikası içindeki durumunu araştırmaktadır.  
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METHODOLOGY 
 
This research has primarily relied on secondary sources. While a significant portion of the 
bibliography was reserved to works published after September 11th, 2001, books on American 
history were nevertheless given room in order to reveal patterns of religiosity in America. 
Works that focus solely on the issues of religion, and secularism were also used in parallel 
with an effort to avoid possible mistakes in terminology.  
Though not quoted in the research directly, other texts, such as films were also 
checked as possible sources. Especially, selected American new wave films made in the 
1970’s, and more popular ones from the last decade or so were seen in an aim to perceive how 
the “liberal” America sees its “conservative” counterpart. Along the same lines, 
documentaries on the religious right in America were observed but not mentioned in the 
research. 
The aim in limiting the research to the post-9/11 era derives from a two-fold logic: 
First, as argued above, the role of religion in American politics was arguably ever so apparent 
to the outsider eye before this period; and second, for a research at this level, it would be too 
tough a challenge to deal with the issue since the very foundations of this state. Historical 
context was given marginal space, and most of the examples that would support the argument 
were taken from the late twentieth century, while the argument itself aimed at the period after 
September 11th, 2001. 
A deductive approach was applied throughout the process of research. Data was 
gathered from a myriad of books and articles, most of which did not make it to the final draft. 
The end result, however, did not support the tentative answer in the thesis proposal, which 
claimed that the religious right in America had become so powerful that it helped shape a 
significant part of the of the Bush government’s agenda. On the other hand, the outcome of 
the research suggested that while the religious right had indeed become strong and its effect 
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was apparent on issues such as US’ attitude towards Israel, it was still far from having a hold 
on power, even at this period when George W. Bush has still a year into his presidency.  
Finally, the research has tried to stick to the principle of objectivity as hard as it can in 
order to avoid whatever prejudices its author may have.   
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DISCLAIMER 
 
Two issues that should have been included within this research were left outside, both because 
of considerations of time and space.  
 The first of these was the issue of Native Americans and how they were treated by the 
settlers from the Old World. As noted in the research, the American religious culture relies to 
a large degree to the principle of tolerance and an adherence to plurality. Yet when the history 
of Native Americans is taken into consideration, one would probably feel that the way they 
were perpetrated by the settlers contradicts impressively with the whole rhetoric of tolerance. 
However, it is an issue so vast in size that it probably would not fit within the small area in the 
confines of this research.  
 Another subject worth mentioning was the role played by the “neocons” in American 
politics after September 11. Although it was touched upon slightly, the issue was not given 
enough space to explicate adequately how this group of people affected the Bush 
administration as well as the public opinion. As with the subject of Native Americans, the 
influence of “neocons” was left out or mentioned of only marginally due to the limitations of 
this paper.  
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Introduction: Patterns of Religiosity 
On the day that Princess Diana was buried, large numbers of British people filled the 
churches, to share their sorrow in communion. Other instances when Britons pay a visit to the 
church include Christmas and Easter, where they go to see the Christmas lights and enjoy 
painting eggs. They willingly attend church ceremonies at the event of births, marriages, and 
deaths. Also, they still enjoy having their marriage vows made before God (Hunt, 2003: 1). 
In Western Europe, God is on the wane1. Religiosity, however, persists. In Britain, 
public engagement with churches may have been replaced with “private” or “personal means 
of reaching spirituality and meaning in life, but this only makes religious practices, beliefs, 
and symbols less visible” (Norris, Inglehart, 2005: 88). The proportion of those who still hold 
a conviction to Christian values, along with the unchanged percentage number of those 
believing in nontraditional sources (fortunetelling, ghosts, horoscopes) tells us that while 
religion is losing blood, religious beliefs are not out of the scene yet (Robin, Haddaway, 
Marler, 1998).   
 Another case in point is concerned with “church taxes” in Germany. Here, the state 
does not endorse any religion (which means that there are no longer state churches), and there 
is complete religious freedom. But most religious institutions are registered as “corporations 
of public law”, and therefore they are entitled to eight percent of the individual’s income tax. 
Citizens have the right to declare themselves as “religiously unaffiliated” and therefore get rid 
of this eight percent. However, “what is surprising is how many –indeed the majority at least 
in the western part of the country- have not done it.” The reasons they give as a justification 
of their attitude vary: “because they might need the church at some point in their lives, 
                                               
1
 A comparison of surveys which asked people to differentiate between belief in a personal God and belief in a 
more impersonal “spirit” or “life force” indicates the type of theistic belief that has lost favor. Over five decades 
the percentage of the British population professing belief in an impersonal God (a spirit or life force) has 
fluctuated only 2 percentage points, increasing from 38% in the 1940s/1950s to 40% in the 1990’s. However, 
those professing belief in a personal God declined 12 percentage points from 43% in the 1940s/1950s to 31% in 
the 1990s (Robin, Haddaway, Marler, 1998). 
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because they want the church to give moral guidance to their children, because they see the 
church as important for the moral fabric of society” (Berger, 2005: 116).  
 The cases of Britain and Germany suggest that even though the role played by 
organized church in religious life declines, religiosity is still a social fact. In America, on the 
other hand, there is no organized church as such, but in its disorganized manner, it can be the 
most influential among its counterparts in the developed world. 
 According to a survey, 85 percent of Americans express allegiance to an organized 
faith, and a third of them attend a house of worship on a weekly basis (Brooks, 2006). A more 
revealing account on Christianity and Judaism in America notes that; 
When asked in 2003 simply whether they believed in God or not, 92% [of Americans] 
said yes. In a series of 2002-03 polls, 57% to 65% of Americans said religion was 
very important in their lives, 23% to 27% said fairly important, and 12% to 18% said 
not very important. Large proportions of Americans also appear to be active in the 
practice of their religion. In 2002 and 2003, an average of 65% claimed membership 
in a church or synagogue. About 40% said they had attended church or synagogue in 
the previous seven days, and roughly 33% said they went to church at least once a 
week. In the same period, about 60% of Americans said they prayed one or more 
times a day, more than 20% once or more a week, about 10% less than once a week, 
and 10% never (Huntington, 2004: 8). 
Compared with figures on Britain, these look highly interesting. One explanation states that 
there is no need to be surprised at the high levels of religiosity in America, because it 
represents how the Americans have always been: “extremely religious and overwhelmingly 
Christian.” The first settlers in the 17th century came to America and settled there in large part 
for religious reasons. In the following century, they defined their Revolution in Biblical terms. 
Revolution reflected their “covenant with God,” and the War of Independence was fought 
between “God’s elect” and the British “Antichrist.” The Declaration of Independence (but not 
the Constitution) laid the basis of its legitimacy on “Nature’s God”, the “Creator”, the 
“Supreme Judge of the World”, and “divine Providence” (op. cit., p. 8).  
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 Another account emphasizes the structure of the church, or rather, of the churches in 
the U.S. The proliferation of diverse churches within Protestantism has maximized choice and 
competition among faiths, and therefore mobilized the American public. Also, because of 
their diversity, churches have become subject to market forces, being dependant on their 
ability to attract clergy and volunteers, along with money that will flow from their members, 
while European churches rely on state subsidies. This eventually makes the European 
religious monopolies less innovative and efficient. Individual churches of America, on the 
other hand, attract new adherents by offering social activities beyond worshipping, such as 
religious education, arts groups, engagement in community politics, and voluntary services 
such as soup kitchens. This makes the American religious culture a much more lively and 
active area than its European counterpart. 
 Obviously, this constitutes only a small part of the answer as to why Americans are so 
religious. What makes them believe that they are the “good” people, as opposed to the “evil” 
terrorists?  
 American Protestant Christianity has always played an important role in American 
life. This role became most apparent in periods where Americans’ interaction with modernism 
seemed to include a certain level of confrontation. Since the early 18th century, modernity 
came in many forms; it came as Darwin’s Theory of Evolution, as dancing, urbanization, 
pornography, abortion, secularism, etc. Every time the American society felt the sting of one 
of these side effects of modernity, a part of it sought shelter in religion. As much as, say, the 
counterculture movement of the 1970’s (see p. 17) was influential, it nevertheless also gave 
way to the emergence of a conservative movement that defined itself along patriotic and 
religious lines. Novelties like anti-Vietnam War protests and sexual revolution were deeply 
disturbing to a significant proportion of Americans. American religious conservatism, as to be 
shown with various examples throughout this paper, has often taken a tough, reactionary 
attitude against the inevitable intrusion of modernity into everyday life. To a certain degree, 
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this research is an account of how the religious right tries to get back at modernity whenever it 
feels attacked.  
In the post-9/11 period, however, thanks largely to the remarks made by George W. 
Bush and most evangelicals and fundamentalists who supported him, the religious right in 
America became much more visible in the international scene. Secularists everywhere 
shivered with the fear that the most powerful country in the world is falling into the hands of 
religious radicals. Liberals and moderate conservatives in America panicked at the site of the 
growing political power of the evangelicals. In short, everybody was concerned. 
 It is the aim of this research, then, to explicate how the religious right in America 
came to be what it is today, and the nature of its political clout at the beginning of the post-
9/11 era. 
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1. A NATION WITH THE SOUL OF A CHURCH: CHRISTIANITY 
IN AMERICA 
 
1.1.  Historical Background  
Over 90% percent of Americans say they believe in God and two-thirds claim to be 
members of a church […] Voters do not like atheists: 41% say they would never vote 
for one, far more than say they would not vote for an evangelical, Catholic, or Jew 
(The Economist, No: 8378, 2004).   
The presence of such figures in arguably the most advanced country in the world seems at 
first surprising, if not outright shocking. Yet the high level of religiosity among Americans is 
not a new phenomenon, and it surely dates far back than the relatively recent rise of 
evangelicalism and fundamentalism. 
In both Europe and America, most of the rural population remained largely medieval 
in its thinking and behaviour until the nineteenth century. In Europe, the civilizing of the rural 
population was managed by the state, along with the help of the upper class. Church’s role in 
this transformation was marginal.  
 However, when the first settlers came to America, there was no state as such. In these 
areas, “it was above all the churches that prevented the settlers from lapsing into not only 
complete barbarism but isolation.” In general, church was the sole social institution in the 
entire area where the local population could meet regularly, and where the children received 
education. Therefore, without the Protestant Church, the modernization of the American 
societies would have been impossible. Still, while it was laying the basis for a modern social 
and economic order, it also created a religious culture that often found itself in conflict with 
the modern culture, as it evolved in the rest of the Western world (Lieven, 2005: 126).  
 American Protestantism has had a decisive effect on the shaping of American society 
and culture, and it still continues to do so, unlike the situation in Europe. And the roots of this 
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perpetual influence have to be looked for in the early 17th century, when the first settlers came 
to America with a sense of special, divine mission- a feeling that continues to occupy the 
collective American psyche. 
 
1.1.1.  From Colonies to States: The Puritan Era  
As the first seeds of its foundation came to be sown, the United States of America was 
showing signs that it would become a place of religious diversity. Although the original 
settlers were Protestant Christians who were strict in their belief, they carried with themselves 
a firm hope that the new world would be one that is clean of the quarrels of the old world, and 
of the religious ones in particular. Also in this period, “the separation of church and state,” a 
concept that would become one of the most controversial pillars of American political culture 
was being established slowly but firmly.  
When the European colonization of North America began, the Protestant Revolution 
was barely a hundred years old. Many of the new settlers had painful memories of the 
religious turmoil that dominated that period. Most of them were grandchildren of people who 
were part of either one of the two sides that aimed at redefining Christianity’s practices. Thus 
the religious atmosphere of the era was one of bloody conflicts rather than peaceful discussion 
and tolerance (Gaustad, 2003: 2).  
The first permanent colony –Jamestown- was established in 1607, within the larger 
area named Virginia. It naturally became home to the Anglican Church, the national Church 
of England. At the time, mundane and sacred were not so easily separable from each other, 
and the order of the church was also the order of the state. Laws that derived from that order 
required the Church of England to be the national church of the colony. Harsh measures were 
imposed upon those who failed to join divine services such as morning and evening prayers. 
Anglicanism quickly spread to the colonies founded in the south, and into Pennsylvania, New 
Jersey, and New York. But it was unable to keep competitors outside of its borders. “The 
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European ideal of one church in one nation remained the goal, but it was a goal never fully 
achieved before the American Revolution” (op. cit., p. 6).  
Around the same time, “The single most influential cultural force at work in the new 
nation was the combination of religious beliefs and social attitudes known as Puritanism.” 
Though the degree of adherence differed between denominations, “the organizing principle of 
Puritan social thought was the concept of covenant.” This covenant was not one in which 
parties on both sides of the agreement have obligations to fulfil. Believers are called to the 
covenant individually, through an experience of spiritual rebirth, and therefore form as a 
group a “gathered community” that is bound together by their shared knowledge of individual 
salvation (Reichley, 2002: 55). It is noteworthy here to state that modern evangelicals share 
this same idea of “spiritual rebirth” as an implicit requisite of initiation, as will be discussed in 
the following pages.  
John Winthrop, a layman and a lawyer who would become the first mayor of 
Massachusetts, told his fellow passengers in a sermon as they crossed the Atlantic to America 
in 1630 that theirs “shall be as a city on a hill”, with the eyes of all people are upon them. 
Laying the burden of being obedient and faithful Christians upon the colonists, he preached 
that they would be cursed if they would pursue only their own material wealth and thus turn 
toward evil. This argument kept Puritans going on through various hardships such as 
starvation and harsh criticism from abroad (Gaustad, 2003:10). Positioning themselves on a 
city on a hill that they’ve built through their own efforts, meanwhile, has nevertheless evolved 
in centuries to find its form in the contemporary American understanding that theirs is a 
unique nation with a special mission.  
Winthrop suggested that the public has a tendency to act like a “wild beast,” which is 
to be restrained by divine rules and laws. This principle, which upon its inception was 
intended to imply that “people should be seen but not heard,” also “laid the basis for 
resistance to autocratic government.” The reference made to the inherent corruption of all 
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man–made institutions became Puritanism’s legacy to the future and its contribution to 
democracy, for it paved the way for the deep feeling of distrust for and suspicion towards the 
central administration –an attitude that is commonplace in today’s America (Reichley, 2002: 
57).     
 The word “Puritan” referred to a willingness on the part of worshippers to purify the 
Church of England from the still hanging elements of Roman Catholicism. But Puritanism 
was also called “Congregationalism,” and the term congregational derived from “a desire to 
make each local church or congregation independent, free from the authority of a bishop or a 
synod that could demand of worshippers what to do or what to believe”. But Puritanism was 
not equally eager to let this freedom spread to other denominations that could threaten to 
reduce the scope of its rule (Gaustad, 2003: 7). Although there were individual cases of 
toleration, such as the 1649 Act of Toleration of Maryland which would preserve religious 
freedom for Catholics, there was a sense of intolerance for other denominations especially 
among the authority figures (Reichley, 2002: 82). 
 Still, even though the puritans held an overwhelming majority in the land, they were 
going to become unable to keep the doors closed to the influence of others. In New England, 
there was little space for newcomers and little spirit of tolerance; while Pennsylvania 
gradually became a place of religious toleration, allowing the newly migrating Catholic 
Germans to settle there (Brogan, 2001: 94). Moreover, the Puritan rule was further damaged 
by the Act of Toleration of 1693. By this Act, toleration was extended to all Protestants, and 
ownership of property was replaced by church membership as a requisite for political 
suffrage. And although the puritans held a majority in the colonial legislature, the old severity 
was giving way (Reichley, 60: 2002). Dissenters like Baptists and Methodists, along with the 
support of Presbyterians joined forces to challenge the rule of Anglicans. Though the Act, in 
practical terms, did not immediately guarantee religious toleration as firmly as it was in the 
homeland, the idea of toleration was spreading with the establishment of new denominations. 
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Furthermore, the era of revolution was at hand, and all issues concerned with religious 
freedom were about to change (Gaustad, 2003: 5). 
 
1.1.2.  Independence and Freedom: Unity through Plurality   
During the revolution, “slowly but steadily, an American pattern of religious liberty displaced 
the European pattern of a single national church.” With the advent of revolution, acts of 
toleration committed by individual colonies throughout the 17th century became almost a 
model for all colonies to replicate. Revolution was about liberty, in terms of both the mundane 
and the sacred. For most of the colonists, freedom of the soul was essential to establish 
freedom of the individual (Gaustad, 2003: 13).  
 In 1776, the thirteen states in North America declared in union their individual 
independence from Great Britain. The document that stated this decision was called the 
Declaration of Independence; later named as the founding document of the USA. To a large 
part, it was written by Thomas Jefferson. At that same year, Virginians and others had already 
begun to mobilize in order to sever all ties between the Church of England and their 
respective states. Within itself, this was also a move towards cutting all links between church 
and state, for it included “to stop enforcing any sort of religious conformity in either belief or 
behaviour, and above all to stop collecting taxes from all for the religious benefit of a few.” 
But to Jefferson and some others, this was far from being enough. He thought that a positive 
step had to be taken in order to guarantee religious liberty to all of Virginia’s citizens. So 
when he became governor in 1779, he introduced a “Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom” 
to the legislators. But most of them thought that Virginia was not yet ready to take such 
radical measures, especially with the fighting between Britain and the states still going on. In 
1785, Jefferson accepted an appointment to become the US minister to France, and therefore 
was no longer able to press with his proposed law in Virginia (op. cit., p. 21).  
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 It was now up to James Madison to follow the destiny of the bill. He toned down some 
of the more radical themes in Jefferson’s original text, and then brought the bill to the 
legislature’s attention for debate. At last, in 1786, the bill became Virginia law. Three years 
later, Madison reintroduced the bill, this time at the level of individual states, which had all 
ratified the constitution in those last three years. The First Amendment2, as it was ratified by 
all states in 1791, and therefore had become part of the constitution, reads: “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” 
(op. cit., p. 29). Yet while they agreed upon such a wording, the “Founding Fathers” also 
thought that religious belief was crucial to the well-being of the country. During the 1787 
convention on the drafting of the constitution, when no consensus could be reached at all, 
Benjamin Franklin proposed that each daily session be opened with a prayer, and asked; 
“...And if a sparrow cannot fall to the ground without his [God’s] notice, is it possible that an 
empire can rise without his aid?” (Reichley, 2002: 100). George Washington, often called a 
deist, was “keenly conscious of the public value of religion.” As commander of the 
Continental Army, he ordered all soldiers who were not on actual duty to attend church every 
Sunday. When he became president in 1789, to his presidential oath he added the phrase “so 
help me God,” and every president that succeeded him followed this custom (op. cit., p. 101). 
Though impressed by rationalist humanist ideas of the era, John Adams, the second president 
of the US, also argued that “it is Religion and Morality alone which can establish the 
principles upon which freedom can securely stand. A patriot must be a religious man.” 
Although they held their reservations, the Founders nonetheless shared a largely positive view 
                                               
2
 The US constitution was signed on September 17, 1787. Upon its inception, many of its framers thought that 
including the freedoms outlined in the Bill of Rights to the Constitution would be unnecessary.  Yet after 
vigorous debate, it was adopted. The first of these freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights came to be known 
as the First Amendment. The Bill constituted of the first ten amendments of the Constitution and it went into 
effect in 1791. In its entirety, the First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.” (Source: http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/about.aspx?item=about_firstamd)  
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of religion. What was apparent in their understanding was “the need for religion as an 
underpinning for republican government. And, to varying degrees, they phrased their 
transcendent idealist values through religious connotations (op. cit., p. 103).    
 With the addition of the First Amendment to the constitution, the “Founding Fathers” 
were laying the basis for a realm of religious plurality. While this plurality and freedom of 
exercise were to be two of the defining characteristics of the Republic, they were also going to 
be divisive factors when it comes to everyday social life. And the authority to settle such 
disputes was no other than the Supreme Court.  
  
1.1.3.  A Lonely Court   
During the 19th century, the Court went through a relatively quiet period. Yet in the year 
1878, it handled a case that stood out among others with its significance in terms of the social 
effects of religious practices. In 1862, the Congress outlawed polygamy in the territories, 
clearly aiming at the Mormons –a sect infamous for allowing men to have several wives. 
Then, in 1878, a Mormon man who had previously been convicted of polygamy appealed to 
the Supreme Court on the grounds that the First Amendment allowed him to fulfil his 
religious obligations freely. But the court decided that Congress could not have any authority 
over mere opinion, but was free to forbid acts which were “in violation of social duties or 
subversive of good order.” Polygamy, it concluded that, was such an action, but not an 
opinion. Chief Justice Waite, upon delivering the Court’s unanimous decision, made reference 
to Thomas Jefferson’s idea that clauses on religion require “a wall of separation between 
church and state.” This was in fact a historic moment in terms of future decisions to be taken 
by the court, for the “wall” concept and the reasoning that derives from it would be referred to 
on various instances throughout the new century (Reichley, 2002: 120).  
 During the 1920’s, in several southern states, fundamentalists had seen to it that laws 
that prohibit the teaching of the theory of evolution were enacted. John Scopes, a high-school 
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biology teacher defied the state’s laws by teaching Darwinian theory. Consequently, he was 
taken to the local court and convicted of breaking the law. This trial took its place in the 
collective American memory also as the “Monkey trial” because of the way the 
fundamentalists’ arguments sounded on creationism. When the trial came to an end, William 
Jennings Bryan, popular fundamentalist, part of the prosecution team and then presidential 
candidate had become “a laughing stock.” Later, the Supreme Court reversed the decision on 
technicality (op. cit., p. 207).  
 By the 1950’s American society had already become a realm of religious pluralism. 
Yet, although the constitution was prohibiting it and practice was quitted by most states, the 
state of Maryland required “a declaration of belief in the existence of God” by every official 
in the state. In the late 1950’s, Roy Torcaso was denied the position of notary public because 
he, as an atheist, refused to take the oath. He took his case to the Supreme Court in 1961, 
which agreed that “neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a 
person ‘to profess a belief or a disbelief in any religion,’” and that therefore, the state of 
Maryland had violated Torcaso’s rights that stemmed from the First Amendment (Gaustad, 
2003: 52). 
 According to a 1960 national survey, one-third of American schools began school day 
by saying devotional prayer, and 42 percent also required reading the Bible. But in 1962 
parents of five children took to the supreme court the question of whether the reading of 
Regents’ prayer in New Hyde Park schools was constitutional or not. The court had so far 
shown reluctance on dealing with school prayer cases, but this time it could not avoid getting 
involved anymore. The majority of justices in the court decided that; “in this country it is no 
part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American 
people to recite as part of a religious program carried on by the government” (Reichley, 2002: 
142). But the issue was far from being resolved. Opinion polls have repeatedly shown that 
nearly 75 percent of the population favoured saying of prayers at school. In some rural areas, 
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it is reported that Bible reading did not even stop. In the 1980’s, President Reagan tried to 
reintroduce the practice through an amendment in the constitution, but failed to do so. To this 
day, practices of religion at schools remain a widely discussed issue among Americans (op. 
cit., p. 146).  
 Another controversial issue was abortion. This was a highly dividing issue, drawing 
thick lines between “pro-life” and “pro-choice” camps. In the early 1970’s, there was a large 
variety of abortion laws among states, and women who did not have the chance to have it in 
their own state could go to another where abortion is legal. But those who did not have the 
means to leave their state had to rely on “back-alley” operations which were neither legal nor 
hygienic. So in 1973, in the now-famous “Roe v. Wade” trial, the court decided that state laws 
that ban abortion are a violation of individual rights and privacy. Yet again, as with the 
problem of Bible reading at schools, the issue of abortion remained a hot topic of debate to 
this day (Gaustad, 2003: 58).  
 Supreme Court decisions were widely discussed in the American public. On trials 
linked with religion, the court’s decision at times differed from the majority of the public 
opinion, as is evident in the subject of Bible reading. And within this group of people that 
disagreed with the court were fundamentalists and evangelicals, who influence and shape the 
American social and political culture to a certain extent.   
 
1.2. The Christian Right 
Religion explains both Americans’ sense of themselves as a chosen people and their 
belief that they have a duty to spread their values throughout the world. [...] In one 
sense, religion is so important to life in the United States that it disappears into the 
mix. Partisans on all sides of important questions regularly appeal to religious 
principles to support their views, and the country is so religiously diverse that support 
for almost any conceivable foreign policy can be found somewhere. Yet the balance of 
power among the different religious strands shifts over time; in the last generation, 
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this balance shifted significantly, and with dramatic consequences. The more 
conservative strains within American Protestantism have gained adherents, and the 
liberal Protestantism that dominated the country during the middle years of the 
twentieth century has weakened (Mead, 2006).  
Such is the significance of religion to Americans, according to Walter Russell Mead. Yet 
among these ever-competing strands, three of them stand out with their influential nature, 
namely; the fundamentalist, the liberal, and the evangelical ones. Each of these, accordingly, 
had their impacts on Americans politics at varying degrees during different periods of time. 
And for the time being, the fundamentalist and the evangelical strands are seen to be having 
the most, if any, effect on policy decisions (op. cit., p. 2006). It is these two subdivisions of 
American Protestantism, and their influence on politics, that we will turn to now.  
 
1.2.1. Evangelicalism 
At times hard to distinguish from each other and inextricably intertwined; (although figures 
are given below) neither evangelicalism nor fundamentalism can be seen as a distinct 
religious organization the members of which have their names on a list. Rather, they are both 
religious movements, each of which is composed of a “coalition of submovements.” 
 The word ‘Evangelical’, which originates from the Greek word for “gospel”, 
eventually became the common name for the religious revival movements that took place in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The evangelical gospel preached the proclamation of 
Christ’s saving work through his death on the cross and the necessity of personally trusting 
him for eternal salvation (Marsden, 1991: 2). Similarly, today’s evangelicalism includes all 
Christians who cherish their religious traditions as to affirm the principles of nineteenth 
century evangelical consensus. These principles of evangelicalism are, “the Reformation 
doctrine of the final authority of the Bible; the real historical character of God’s saving work 
recorded in Scripture; salvation to eternal life based on the redemptive work of Christ; the 
importance of evangelism and missions; and the importance of a spiritually transformed life.” 
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In the case of modern American evangelism, these essentials can roughly be summarized into 
three: to believe that the sole authority of the religion is the Bible; to believe that the only path 
to salvation goes through a life-changing experience brought by the Holy Spirit through belief 
in Jesus Christ (the “born-agains”) (op. cit., p. 65); and to evangelize (to take on a journey to 
save other souls and to lead them to salvation/ to convert them). However, evangelicalism 
cannot be confined within the limits of a loose group of Christians who happen to believe 
some of the same old doctrines; for modern evangelicalism looks more like a semi-organized 
interdenominational movement, with various periodicals, tv and radio shows, and a number of 
leaders and institutions (op. cit., p. 5). As such, it is a religious movement composed of 
various denominations that agree on some basic principles and mobilize around a specific set 
of issues, such as the antiabortion, pro-life movement.  
Such diversity is rooted in the established feeling of distrust for centralized 
institutions, including the institutional church. Except at the level of congregations, the 
organized church has little part to play in the movement (op. cit., p. 81).  Hence, those 
subgroups of evangelicals do not always agree on each and every issue they face, and they 
have more than one centre of authority, yet for the last two elections in America they’ve 
shown enough solidarity to help draw the nation’s political path (in 2000, 68 percent of 
evangelicals, and in 2004, 78 percent of them voted for Bush). The most populous of the 
evangelical denominations is the Southern Baptist Convention, with more than 16.3 million 
members. The second largest one consists of the African American churches, including the 
National Baptist Convention, U.S.A., and the National Baptist Convention of America, each 
of which claim 5 million members. The largest Pentecostal denomination is, with 5.5 million 
members, the predominantly African American Church of God in Christ. The rapidly growing 
Assemblies of God, which has 2.7 million members, is the largest denomination which is not 
predominantly black. The second largest predominantly white evangelical denomination is the 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, with 2.5 million members (Mead, 2006).  
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 Observing Kansas as a microcosm for the change in the tone of cultural and political 
attitudes throughout the United States, Thomas Frank quotes the experiences of a particular 
individual who, as a teacher, stood by the left during his whole carrier. Yet at the late 1980’s, 
this figure begins to feel that “the sanctity of the fetus outweighed all of his other concerns,” 
and from there on he internalized the notion that “Christians are vilely persecuted” in America 
by the liberal elite media and the American Civil Liberties Union, the feminists; all of whom, 
supposedly, have a disdain for traditional American values (Frank, 2005: 4). Yet this change 
of perceptions is not particular to this individual at all, and its roots go deeper than religious 
sensitivity alone. Feeling of being surrounded by liberal persecutors was widespread in parts 
of American society.  
 To the traditional-minded American, the culture that developed after the 1960’s 
seemed like a “pandemonium of scarcely credible monsters and abominations; and much of 
the television continues nothing less than a daily assault on their world of faith and culture.” 
The counterculture movement (protestors against the Vietnam War, sexual revolution, 
Woodstock Festival, etc.) was a novelty for sure, and it seemed to shake the foundations of 
whatever the traditional American has known as moral and decent. Economically, the long 
post-war boom was put to an end with the oil shock of 1973, and the following three decades 
witnessed long term stagnation in the real incomes of middle class Americans. The White 
working class of Midwest was used to a realm where their steady work and rising income was 
guaranteed. When America came to the end of that realm, it was a serious blow to their 
“moral economy” (Lieven, 2005: 142).  
By 1968, the New Deal consensus had broken down. The grim picture of the Vietnam 
War, the black riots, and the counterculture movement had fatally damaged the idea of a 
“liberal-Protestant-Catholic-Jewish-secular-good citizenship consensus.” This was a backlash 
with a largely secular character. Yet with the help of the coming period of economic 
stagnation, an even greater backlash from the opposite direction was looming. And in the 
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second half of the 1970’s, when it came, it came in the from of a religious coalition around 
such issues as antiabortion, anti-pornography, and symbolic religious issues such as school 
prayer (Marsden, 1991: 95). 
Frank calls this combination a cultural “Great Backlash, a style of conservatism that 
first came snarling onto the stage in response to the partying and protests of the late sixties.” 
And its  distinctive characteristic is that, unlike earlier forms of conservatism, it mobilized 
voters with massive social issues (abortion, gay marriage, supreme court decisions on 
religious issues) and then those are tied to pro-business economic policies (Frank, 2005: 5). 
This Great Backlash was in fact the coming together of two different political factions: 
“traditional business Republicans; and working- class Middle Americans.” Most evangelicals 
found their place in this second group (op. cit., p. 136).   
The engine that drives the radical Christian right in the United States […] is not 
religiosity, but despair. It is a movement built on the growing personal and 
economic despair of tens of millions of Americans, who watched helplessly as 
their communities were plunged into poverty by the flight of manufacturing jobs, 
their families and neighbours torn apart by neglect and indifference (Hedges, 
2007: 33).   
Despair, accordingly, crosses economic boundaries, and reaches those members of the middle 
class who live suburban life in communities that lack a truly cohesive factor in their 
environment (op. cit., p. 33). Yet here the evangelical churches enter the scene in order to 
save these desperate souls. Most of these churches, with their web of schools; study groups; 
parents’, children’s, adolescents’, men’s, women’s and senior’s clubs; marriage counselling 
services; excursions; sports activities and even touristic trips to the Holy Land, add a strong 
sense of community to suburban life, which is somewhat hollow and arid (Lieven, 2005: 138). 
As for economic despair, Chris Hedges explains the scenery as:  
There are parts of United States, including whole sections of former manufacturing 
centres such as Ohio, that resemble the developing world, with boarded-up 
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storefronts, dilapidated houses, potholed streets and crumbling schools. The end of 
the world is no longer an abstraction to many Americans (Hedges, 2007: 33). 
However, as shown in the figures above, evangelicals cannot be said to be limited to poor, 
white, working class Americans; as currently, born-again Christians (those who experienced 
a life changing event that introduced them to the path of Christ) are richer and better 
educated than the average American. Furthermore, there are 25 million black evangelicals, 
who are little by little moving to the right, along with an estimated 8 million Hispanic 
evangelicals (The Economist, 2005, No: 8432).  
 Ultimately, “Evangelicalism is ‘a religious persuasion that has repeatedly adapted to 
the changing tones and rhythms of modernity’, especially when it comes to the employment 
of modern mass media and modern techniques of mass mobilization”. In the 1960’s, A.A. 
Allen, a prominent Pentecostalist preacher declared that “The most treacherous foe in 
America isn’t communism (as perilous as it may be), Nazism, Fascism, or any alien ideology, 
but MODERNISM” 3(Lieven, 2005: 124). Evangelicalism, then, with its Megachurches, its 
websites, internet blogs, its television and radio shows, becomes a phenomenon that makes 
use of virtually every social-technological opportunity that modernity provides in order to 
spread its vision. But controversially, it gives its followers substitutes for what they’ve lost 
(economic well-being, cultural sterility, and spiritual fulfilment) as a direct result of 
modernity’s intrusion into their lives. Thus, as a movement, it is explicitly anti-modern in its 
rhetoric and promises, yet apparently modern in form.  
  
1.2.2. Fundamentalism 
Kudriashova argues that, although it usually gives the opposite impression, modern 
fundamentalism is a phenomenon of the present. It utters a feeling of distress that results from 
the conditions of the present, and emphasizes a return to a certain “golden age,” where 
                                               
3
 Capitals in the original. 
 29 
everything was at the peak of excellence. One of its distinguishing characteristics is a belief 
that the heavenly can be realized in the mundane, through actively taking part in politics 
(Kudriashova, 2003: 43). So instead of leaving aside all that is corporeal and leaning on the 
ethereal, it emphasizes working through the methods of the material environment to transform 
it into a plane where the sacred will provide the guiding principles of everyday life.     
 The term “fundamentalism” –in spite of its immediate connotation as a phenomenon 
that belongs to the Islamic vocabulary- was first used in the United States to characterize 
certain Christian evangelical groups (primarily Calvinists, Presbyterians, and Baptists) in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Later, it was applied to anti-Darwinists during ‘the 
[Scopes] monkey trial’4 of the 1920’s.” Finally, this term was used only recently by Western 
scholars who study Islam, Judaism, and other religions. The original type of fundamentalism 
(the Protestant one), perceived the Bible as an “embodiment of original purity,” and as a guide 
to mundane activity. It insisted on a return to the roots, the core values, the fundamentals (op. 
cit., p. 41). Also central to this type is the conviction that the United States of America is a 
special country in religious terms. Having its basis on the Puritan era of the eighteenth 
century, Protestant fundamentalism cherishes and accepts the truth of the Holy Scripture as 
historical data, and therefore views America as the “new Israel, on which the salvation of 
other nations depends” (op. cit., p. 45).  
 American Protestant fundamentalists’ willingness to take action and change things 
gets embodied in a one sentence-definition as: “a fundamentalist is an evangelical who is 
angry about something.” Or, to put it more revealingly, “an American fundamentalist is an 
evangelical who is militant in opposition to liberal theology in the churches or to changes in 
cultural values or mores, such as those associated with ‘secular humanism.’” Accordingly, 
evangelicalism includes fundamentalism, yet the two have enough differences between each 
other to lead observers and fundamentalists themselves to seek a special space in which to 
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separate from evangelicalism. Yet the most important aspect of fundamentalists that 
differentiates them from mainstream evangelicals is the former’s willingness to take positive 
action when faced with a challenge (Marsden, 1991: 1). This becomes clearer when we 
measure their political effectiveness by their numbers. It is argued that nearly half of White 
evangelicals (including the fundamentalists) share the Christian right’s ideology. When put to 
numbers, their proportion to the overall population appears somewhere between seven and 
twelve percent. Yet the power they assert on decision making processes –as will be 
exemplified in the following chapter- is disproportionate. And that results to a large part from 
the tight-knit structure of the fundamentalist movement. Like some diasporic communities or 
ethnic minority groups, they demonstrate great social and political commitment; as 
manifested in higher rates of voter turnout, focusing on particular issues and taking action 
upon them, willingness to sacrifice time and money, and demographic concentration in 
politically strategic regions (Lieven, 2005: 141). 
In the 1920’s, following the First World War, all American religious communities 
were faced with an unexpected challenge. The war had brought out the secularization that had 
been growing in American life. Especially in the cities and the eastern part of the country 
(where the educated liberal culture that dominated the media resided), this “revolution of 
morals” was becoming apparent. The late 1910’s witnessed the emergence of the modern 
tabloid newspaper, which included and headlined sensational stories. Movies began to depict 
actors’ and actresses’ sexuality. Along with such changes came “the virtual collapse of 
communal enforcement of standards of personal behaviour that had been among the 
mainstays of the churches.” Women began to smoke in public, did not cover their knees all 
the time (sometimes not even in church), and refused to follow the role model that was 
imposed on them in the form of their domestic mothers. Dancing, which had for so long been 
a taboo for Protestants, had now become part of everyday life, so much so that even some 
church leaders brought it to church youth group meetings. However, there were other 
 31 
Protestants who were horrified by the practice, as one Southern Methodist bishop complained 
that dancing was bringing “the bodies of men and women in unusual relations to each other.” 
Such an atmosphere created an extreme conflict of opinion in many Protestant churches. 
Liberals were optimistic and perceived the breakdown of traditions as an opportunity to build 
a new Christian consensus. Conservatives, on the other hand, were in a state of panic 
witnessing those cultural changes, which they saw as a deterioration of values. Therefore, the 
postwar era forced each party to step in front and see how much they differed in their visions 
for the churches and the American culture (Marsden, 1991: 56).  
The result of this dichotomy was the fundamentalist-modernist conflict that dominated 
much of the 1920’s. Liberals were more aggressive than ever in organizing and attacking their 
conservative rivals. Conservatives, on the other hand, were also organizing, and the most 
notable manifestation of this was the World’s Christian Fundamentals Association, a group 
organized with the purpose of combating modernism. The following year, the conservatives in 
the Northern Baptist Convention organized a “Fundamentals” conference to levy opposition 
against liberalism within the Baptist denomination. The term “fundamentalist” was used here 
for the first time by Curtis Lee Laws, editor of a conservative newspaper, who coined it to 
describe those who were willing “to do battle royal for the Fundamentals.” Soon after, the 
term became one to describe all American Protestants who were ready “to wage ecclesiastical 
and theological war against modernism in theology and cultural changes that modernists 
described” (op. cit., p. 57). 
    Hence, in the 1920’s, this militant wing of conservatives emerged and called 
themselves fundamentalists. These were evangelicals who were ready to fight the liberal 
theology that was becoming stronger due to the changes in the dominant values and belief in 
the culture. By the middle of the decade, they had gained wide national prominence. Their 
ranks included Baptists, Presbyterians, Methodists, Disciples, Episcopalians, holiness groups, 
Pentecostals, and a variety of other denominations. Yet by the 1930’s fundamentalism had 
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lost its initial appeal, and it began to take a more limited meaning. Many fundamentalists 
sought further radicalization, and started to leave mainline Protestant denominations. 
Following this, separation from church denominations became a test of true faith. In the 
coming decades, and especially since the 1960’s, “fundamentalist” came to mean those 
conservatives who were separatists and who no longer belonged to any of the mainline 
denominations, except for Baptists. (op. cit., p. 3).  
 Still, as is the case with evangelicals, “there is no generally accepted authoritative 
body to define what fundamentalists are or believe.” Yet modern fundamentalism can be said 
to have three characteristics: a high view of biblical authority and inspiration; a powerful will 
to protect the historical Protestant faith from the Roman Catholic and modernist, secular, and 
non-Christian influence; and the conviction that believers should separate themselves from the 
non-Christian world. In addition, resemblances between evangelicals and fundamentalists is 
not limited to the ambiguities one faces when attempting to categorize them. They both see 
great importance in the doctrinal tenets of Christianity. Accordingly, men can only redeem by 
Christ’s crucifixion and resurrection, and that humanity by itself is incapable of “any moral 
law whatever.” Therefore, by admitting one’s sinful nature and accepting Christ’s sacrifice, 
one gets “born again.” Also, fundamentalists, like evangelicals, are careful in separating those 
who are “saved” and those who are not. Both believe that human beings who die without 
accepting Christ are sentenced to eternal separation from God. Similarly, they argue that the 
ones who have not been “saved” are incapable of doing good deeds by their own. And finally, 
most evangelicals share the fundamentalist conviction with regards to the end of the world; 
namely, that the biblical prophecies will be fulfilled, that Christ will return to establish a 
thousand years-long peace, and that, therefore, all human efforts to build a peaceful world are 
to no avail (Mead, 2006). This twofold belief becomes more significant considering the 
American support for Israel (the place where, according to Biblical teachings, Christ will be 
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reborn), and Americans’ distrust towards the United Nations; an organization known for its 
peace-building initiatives.  
 However, along with their similarities, fundamentalists and evangelicals also have 
their differences in the ways they see the world. On the issue of who can be “saved”, 
fundamentalists tend to have a more strict position, seeing the world as divided into two 
camps with little in common, and that some will not be saved before their death. Through 
Christ’s sacrifice and crucifixion, God intended to save only a small number of souls; the 
remaining ones have no chance of salvation. Evangelicals, on the other hand, have a softer 
outlook, arguing that salvation is available to everyone, because God loves each soul and 
suffers a great deal of sorrow when any of them are lost. So, he seeks to save them all, not 
only a small caste.  
 Most conservative American Protestants attach a great deal of importance to spiritual 
experience, and therefore fundamentalists are generally known as un-intellectual and 
emotional in their beliefs. However, the fundamentalists are in fact more prone than the 
evangelicals to follow their ideas to their logical conclusion. They are more willing to create a 
“consistent and all-embracing ‘Christian Worldview’” and to apply it to the world. This 
attitude finds its most explicit form in their approach to the issue of evolution. Most 
evangelicals disagree with the proponents of the theory of evolution on grounds that their 
personal experience drives them to recognize Bible as the infallible guide. But they stop there, 
and in general do not oppose the teaching of evolutionary science in public schools and 
universities. Fundamentalists, on the other hand, not only argue that the theory of evolution is 
a sham, but they take on to devise a brand new theory of theirs, called the “creation science.” 
They write textbooks about it, and try to force schools to teach this theory instead of 
Darwin’s, or otherwise, they withdraw their children from those schools (Mead, 2006).  
 And finally, fundamentalism, like evangelicalism itself, is “quintessentially modern, 
offering responses to contemporary conditions and events, including perceived threats from 
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other religions.” It affirms the centrality of holy books to day-to-day activities and aims at 
regulating all aspects of social and individual behaviour. American Christian fundamentalists’ 
reaction is not only against usual suspects like evolutionary theory or communism, but it is 
also against unwanted social changes that are direct results of modernization. And the threat 
emerges not only from the change, but also from the pace of change, as long established 
traditions, habits, beliefs, cultures, and communities are under the threat of being forgotten 
unless they adapt to a state of quick and perpetual changing. At the core of Protestant 
Fundamentalism, lies the idea of “an American nation forsaken by God, and turned into 
Babylon, a world beyond redemption in this dispensation until the Second Coming5” (Hayes, 
1998: 29). Therefore, according to fundamentalist belief, all outside forces that drive 
Christians to lead ungodly lives must be diverted, and daily life has to be arranged in 
accordance with the guiding principles laid out by the Bible. Because of such strictness, most 
fundamentalists choose to separate themselves as much as they can from the rest of the 
society, unlike most evangelicals, who do not seek such separatism.  
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 “Second Coming”: Rebirth of Jesus Christ. 
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2. THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT and ITS SORROWS 
One focus for American fundamentalists is “the Rapture”- the moment when true 
Christians, it is believed, will be taken up to heaven. This is based on a passage in 
Thessalonians: “First the Christian dead will rise, then we who are still alive shall join 
them. Caught up in clouds to meet the lord in the air.” Fundamentalists see this not as 
a metaphor, but as an imminent fact. In Florida you come across bumper stickers 
warning that the car may become driverless should the rapture arrive (Micklethwait 
and Woolridge, 2005: 310).  
Most of those people who use such bumper stickers with a sense of cautiousness (along with 
others who are not as strict) also believe that the Second Coming will take place on Israeli 
soil, that a fetus’ life is sacred and its mother does not have the right to take it from it, that a 
big-time criminal can be and should be killed by the state, that the theory of evolution is make 
believe, and that America has a responsibility to fight with poverty in Africa, along with a 
variety of other beliefs. On all these issues, they volunteer to take part, make sacrifices from 
their personal lives, devote money and time to whatever cause they follow, and on some of 
these causes, though not all, they generate enough political clout to make the authorities 
decide on a certain manner. Yet, in order to understand how they became so powerful on such 
controversial subjects, we must first analyze how the Christian right is organized.  
 
2.1. The Organization of the Persecuted 
One of the biggest complaints of American conservatives is the “liberal overreach”. Liberals, 
with their hold of media, business, and other sources of power, are persecuting the rest of the 
country, which has no other desire than to live “the American way of life” free from all forms 
of oppression. To express their agony, they rely on their own channels of communication, 
which, in their perspective, is not nearly as powerful and wide ranging as those of the liberals. 
However, this feeling of victimhood also breeds a strong sense of social and political 
responsibility, and results in the masses of conservative Christians who mobilize to help 
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realize their ever-lost causes. Combined with the (contrary to the popular belief among 
conservatives) immense strength of Christian right network, the persecuted are becoming one 
of the most powerful political forces in the United States, if not the strongest.   
 
2.1.1. The Cruel Liberals vs. the Poor Red American    
The mass of evangelical organizations that determine modern right-wing Christian agenda has 
a reactionary nature. And this reaction is aimed at two threats: The vast cultural and economic 
changes that America went through since the 1960’s; and the liberal elite who not only 
perpetrate the change but also persecute the underdog, the faithful, the Christian. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, the first of these threats is very real. The second one, however, is to a 
large extent imaginary.  
 The idea that there is a liberal clique composed of journalists, scholars, Supreme Court 
judges, officials in the various departments of the administration begins with the premise of 
“the two Americas” on the map. According to Frank, the great dream of the conservatives 
since the 1930’s has been a working class movement “that for once takes their side of the 
issues, that votes Republican and reverses the achievements of the working-class movements 
in the past.” After the 2000 elections, the electoral map of United States was such that would 
give the conservatives ground for their claims on the working-class people. At one side, there 
were the vast plains of inland “red” states where people voted republican, at the other, there 
were those little spaces where people lived in big cities and voted for Al Gore (red and blue 
were the colours designated for Republican and Democrat victories, respectively). On this 
map, conservatives saw a Democrat constituency “restricted to the old-line, blueblood states 
of the Northeast, along with the hedonist left coast.” The small number of Midwest states that 
voted democrat was not taken into consideration in this scheme as they would disrupt the 
rhetoric of an America divided between elites and layman (Frank, 2005: 14). 
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 In the imagination of the Great Backlash, America is always in a state of quasi-civil 
war between the millions of simple, plain Americans, and the intellectual, omnipotent liberals 
who run the country but who also show disdain for the way of life of the rest of the country 
(op. cit., p. 13). This categorization helped conservatives build the stereotypical liberal. 
According to this model, liberals are identifiable by their tastes and consumer preferences. 
They drive Volvos, they eat imported cheese, and they drink lattes, all of which indicate to 
their “essential arrogance and foreignness.” In this analysis, the economic interests of each 
party are left aside, because they are irrelevant compared to lattes. The liberal elite; the 
columnists, the sitcom writers, academics, film makers, and artists are against everything that 
the “heartland America” stands for. The only thing they feel about the red America is 
contempt. 
 Frank argues that leaving aside all of its huge errors and massive exaggerations, even 
an argument as biased as this has its points, even if much less telling than it appears to be. 
Accordingly, there are many aspects of American life that does not reflect on the culture 
industry’s products; also, vast reaches of the country have moved towards conservatism, 
leaving behind their traditional democratic roots; and finally, there really is a small fraction of 
“cosmopolitan” upper-middle class that sees itself as socially enlightened, that has no idea of 
what’s happening in the inlands of America, and that consumes lattes. Still, this in no way 
alters the fact that the conservative pundits are exploiting their created image of the liberal to 
make the poorer heartland Americans reflect their anger on this, instead of the real economic 
sources of their decline (op. cit., p. 19).  
 American liberals are puzzled by why so many American workers, farmers and 
shopkeepers have, due to cultural affiliation, moved towards conservatism and voted for 
Republicans. After all, the radical capitalism espoused by the Republican Party is directly 
contrary to their economic interests. What’s missing here is the fact that these voters belong to 
a world of long-standing and immensely strong religious and cultural codes, which is 
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constantly under attack from the social, cultural, and economic changes. This phenomenon is 
not peculiar to the United States. In Western European societies, too, as long as religious 
belief remained important, it had decisive effect on the direction of political affiliations. But 
in America, the laissez-faire capitalism that the religious right supports is also the main factor 
that undermines its well-being (Lieven, 2005: 127). 
 
2.1.2. The Web: The Interdependent Conservative Network      
Liberals’ shock on how so many people voted against their economic interests is in fact the 
result of a lack of careful observation on their part. Conservatism has long been seen by 
liberals as a movement that lacked intellectual basis. However, such an idea couldn’t be more 
wrong about today’s conservatism.  
 Every year, during the Conservative Political Action Conference (an event organized 
by the American Conservative Union), nearly five thousand conservative activists come 
together to listen to leading conservative figures, such as Dick Cheney. Sessions during the 
2003 conference include: “Islam: Religion of Peace?” and “Myths, Lies and Terror: The 
Growing Threat of Radical Environmentalism.” All those activists who run from one hall to 
another to listen to speeches with such interesting topics are in fact the footsoldiers of the 
movement, along with hundreds of thousands of others who think like them. They are the 
ones who knock on doors, sign petitions, telephone radio shows and attend precinct meetings. 
They are, also, “the muscle-bound body” on which conservative think tanks sit (Micklethwait 
and Woolridge, 2005: 310).  
  Most notable among these think tanks are the American Enterprise Institute and the 
Heritage Foundation, each of which has several hundred thousand contributors. Another one, 
the Hoover Institution, was once home to thinkers such as Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleezza 
Rice. In addition to that, those members of the Bush administration known as neocons are 
almost completely from conservative think tanks. An
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in influencing the decision makers that they are becoming “America’s shadow government” 
(op. cit., p. 161). Surely, in such an environment, it is nothing but short sightedness to claim 
or assume that conservatives lack a popular intellectual basis. 
 Conservative organizations virtually know no limits when trying to reach possible 
supporters. For example, the “Focus on Family,” an organization that has 1400 employees, 
claims to have a global audience of 20 million people through its television and radio shows, 
books, mass e-mails and counselling. In 2004, Focus set up a political action committee that 
spent $9 million on the election, obviously to be used in Republican Party’s propaganda. 
Another organization, the Arlington Group (a coalition of 60 pro-family groups), started its 
initiatives quietly in 2003. However, when the Massachusetts court decided to uphold gay 
marriage the same year, its activities gained momentum. Now the group is housed in the 
building of “Family Research Council” in Washington, and its issues of focus expanded to 
include abortion (The Economist, 2005, No: 8432).  
 Another strength of the Christian right is its use of mass media. In order to show that 
they have no excuse for failing to get their message out, Republican activist Paul Weyrich 
told a group of White House advisers; “There are 1500 conservative radio talk-show hosts. 
You have Fox News. You have the Internet, where all successful sites are conservative. The 
ability to reach people with our point of view is like nothing we have ever seen before” 
(Wakefield, 2006: 16). Obviously, with such a grip on media, the conservatives have no 
chance to fail on getting their message heard.6 And the message is one of victimhood, one of 
call to arms (as when Geraldo Rivera, the renowned anchorman of Fox News bought a gun 
and declared his determination to kill Osama Bin Laden (Micklethwait and Woolridge, 2005: 
310)) on both the domestic front where the heartless liberals must be challenged and on the 
                                               
6
 Still, the perception of victimhood and being the losing side seems to be at work, as Joseph Bottum, editor of 
the conservative journal First Things argues that: “We’ve been warned by the media, over and over again, that 
Republicans are reshaping America into a Puritan’s paradise. But, at the end of the day, the media mostly won 
and the Republicans mostly lost. Social conservatism is in little better shape now than it was when Bush was first 
elected. In many ways, it is in worse shape” (Bottum, Novak, 2007: 31). 
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international front where terrorists have to be eliminated. The idea that the plain American is 
under attack from more than one sources is transmitted, heard, and echoed.  
 The sorrow and the strength of the Christian right go hand in hand, in a state of mutual 
dependence. The more powerless they feel, the more organized, the more effective they 
become. Having the liberal elite as a scapegoat for the deterioration of their economic 
situation and the degeneration of their culture, they find fresh meaning and ground for battle 
in gathering around issues such as abortion, evolutionary theory, gay marriage, and any other 
area of conflict where they feel persecuted and/ or ignored by the liberals. And as a principle 
of this outlook, no matter what the outcome of the conflict is, they are the losing side; a 
perception that, again, strengthens their will to fight.  
 
2.2. The Sorrows 
 
2.2.1. Abortion: Right to Life    
Janice Learned is a “post-abortive” woman, meaning, she had an abortion. She was a 
participant in the two-day event organized by the Pennsylvania Pro-Life Federation, and the 
event was “dedicated to the 46 million children who have died from legal abortions since 
19737 and the mothers and fathers who mourn their loss.” Learned runs a pregnancy 
counselling clinic in a small town in Pennsylvania, where she contacts young girls and women 
in an attempt to talk them out of abortion. She speaks at local schools in order to promote the 
idea that sexual abstinence is a better method for contraception than birth control. In the fight 
against adoption, she found meaning and purpose that had previously remained unseen to her. 
 As a teenager, she had an abortion. A few years later, she started taking classes at 
Pacific Christian College, where she saw an anti-abortion film called The Silent Scream. The 
movie, accordingly, was showing an abortion process from inside the mother’s womb, where 
                                               
7
 1973 was the year in which the Supreme Court decided on the Roe vs. Wade trial, which proclaimed abortion 
as a constitutional right.   
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one could see the baby trying to dodge the suction tube. After having seen the film, Learned 
sought redemption and joined the fight to make abortion illegal. Her activism became a 
manner to redeem for her “sin” (Hedges, 2007: 33-34). 
 Learned is one of those Americans who want abortion to be banned. Their proportion 
to the overall population is 46 percent. Every year, tens of thousands of them come together in 
Washington, D.C., in order to mark the anniversary of Roe vs. Wade of 1973. Since that date, 
nearly seventy-five other countries have liberalized their abortion laws, and the debate was 
more or less settled in those places. Yet this was not the case with America. Pro-life 
supporters frequently appear on television and compare abortion to Holocaust or slavery. The 
issue has, even if for a while, taken a somewhat terrorist manner, when pro-life extremists 
would blow up clinics and shoot doctors who performed abortion. Politically, some of their 
most prominent gains were the 2003 Congress voting to ban partial-birth abortion, and 
conservative state legislatures enacting laws that prevent minors from having abortions 
without parental consent.  
 In America, abortion embodies the battle between liberals and conservatives, “between 
the America of the courts and the America of the Evangelical churches.” Since the Roe vs. 
Wade decision, it became an example of liberal overreach. European countries have 
liberalized abortion through legislation and referenda, and therefore generated popular 
consent for the legalization. But in America, the Supreme Court (or, as the conservatives 
describe, “five unelected liberally minded judges”) decided that reproductive rights are 
included in a fundamental right to privacy. This right, in turn, is guaranteed by the 
constitution, like freedom of speech and freedom of religion. The decision not only made the 
legalization look like an imposition, but also, the Court’s interpretation has been provocative 
to the conservatives, as the right to abortion is not defined nearly as clearly as, say, the 
freedom of speech. The Christian right has been trying to change the composition of the 
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Court’s members ever since, putting pressure on every administration to appoint more 
conservative-minded judges (Micklethwait and Woolridge, 2005: 309).  
 According to the conservative perception, what made matters worse was the fact that 
with regard to the issue of abortion, the liberal elite was interfering with the very definition of 
human life. As they saw that the jurisdiction over such a philosophical matter as such was 
claimed by doctors and lawyers, the anti-abortionists decided that degradation would not stop 
there. The pattern here is similar with the other issues that conservative backlash suffers from. 
Namely, “overweening professionals, disdainful of the unwashed and uneducated masses, 
force their expert (i.e., liberal) opinions on a world that is not permitted to respond (Frank, 
2005: 200). As long as the Roe vs. Wade decision is concerned, the conservative argument 
seems to have a point. It still is, after all, a highly unpopular decision among 50% of the 
public. Yet as the point of the argument gets exaggerated, it integrates itself into the myth of 
liberal omnipotence and therefore loses validity.  
 Consequently, abortion is a real moral issue, one that has helped forge the alliance 
between Southland and Heartland Protestant conservatives and (even) Catholic conservatives. 
So it is an issue that spreads beyond Protestant evangelicalism and fundamentalism, and is 
therefore cherished by the wider Christian right. Furthermore, anti-abortionist sensitivity 
reflects wider anxieties and serves as a rallying call for a mass political mobilization against 
“a wider set of political and cultural enemies.” These enemies, naturally, are the liberals, and 
dangers that supposedly stem from their presence in American cultural and political life ring 
sounds of national decadence and weakness. This is reflected most evidently in fears of, if 
such degradation persists, God will even forsake or smite America. Jerry Falwell, co-founder 
and leader of Moral Majority, gave voice to these fears in the aftermath of September 11 
attacks when he claimed that America had the attacks coming for its continuous murder of 
unborn children and its tolerance for homosexuality (Lieven, 2005: 131). 
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2.2.2. Theory of Evolution: Darwin’s Theory against the Word of God 
The first encounter of Christian evangelicals with Darwin occurred in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. During this period, many Christian leaders had attacked the theory of 
evolution on grounds that it was inconsistent with Biblical teaching on creation. For 
evangelical fundamentalists, this was all too disturbing and offensive, as they literally 
interpreted the Bible as the sole source of guiding principles. Also, Darwinism was reversing 
the positions of science and Christian faith in relation to each other. According to American 
Christians of the mid-nineteenth century, the scientific revolution of the past two centuries 
had helped affirm that such an intricate and complex design could not have emerged by pure 
coincidence, as Darwinism was seen to suggest. Rather, according to their rationale, such a 
system could only underline the existence of an intelligent designer who put things at work 
(Reichley, 2002: 206; and Marsden, 1991: 36).  
 By the 1920’s, however, the more rationalistic or liturgical branches of Christianity 
had begun to integrate evolution within their doctrines, even if the theological strains 
remained. But for the fundamentalists, any concession towards accommodation was 
unacceptable. Therefore, they proposed legislation to forbid the teaching of Darwinian theory 
to their children, a campaign that drew harsh reaction from religious and civil humanists. 
Such a ban would infringe on science, a phenomenon that most humanists and many regular 
citizens had come to see as authoritative on certain issues. Furthermore, if the government 
would endorse a religiously-driven version of truth, this would represent a massive breach on 
the wall of separation between the church and the state. Thus, with their uncompromising 
attitude on the issue, the fundamentalists were taking their place outside the American 
tradition of pluralism, as laid out by the First Amendment and state constitutional guarantees 
of religious liberty.    
 Due to fundamentalist pressure, several southern states banned the teaching of 
evolution in the early 1920’s. When in 1925, a Tennessee high-school biology teacher, John 
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Scopes, violated the law by teaching the theory, the issue came to a head. He was defended by 
Clarence Darrow, the famous liberal trial lawyer of the time, and the most notable figure in 
the prosecution was William Jennings Bryan, populist, fundamentalist, and presidential 
candidate. Bryan’s inclusion gave the event the air of a “dramatic showdown between 
fundamentalism and modern scepticism.” The amount of press coverage on the trial was 
monumental. Yet such attention only made the fundamentalists appear ridiculous in the eyes 
of the most of the public. The rural setting and the press’ caricatures of fundamentalists as 
hicks and hillbillies prevented fundamentalism from gaining any further strength as a 
movement. And from that year on, the fundamentalists began to gradually lose ground, until 
when, in the 1930’s, they faded into a marginal movement with little political effect, if any 
(Marsden, 1991: 60).  
 Yet, as noted in the previous sections, since the 1960’s there has been a resurgence of 
traditional Christian values, especially in terms of evangelicalism and fundamentalism. This 
obviously found its reflection on the debate of evolution, with the rebirth or resurfacing of the 
creationist/intelligent design movement. Recently, fundamentalists struggled for the enacting 
of laws that would legalize the teaching, or at least mentioning of Biblical accounts on 
creation along with evolutionary ones. But in 1987, the Supreme Court ruled that a Louisiana 
law that required the teaching of “special creation” was unconstitutional (Reichley, 2002: 
207). 
 In the idea of intelligent design, we can see another facet of fundamentalism that 
reveals its inherently modern character. “Fundamentalists have the confidence of 
Enlightenment philosophies that an objective look at ‘the facts’ will lead to the truth.” Their 
view of the Bible is that of an inerrant source; one that delivers flawless knowledge on how 
the universe came to be. But the crux of the argument is that they see those facts as historical 
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and scientific facts.8 To the fundamentalists, the Bible is a collection of true and precise 
positions. In their arguments, they insist on their reliance on reason. But unlike theoretical 
disciplines of social science, in the fundamentalist way of thinking, reason cannot lead to 
loose ends, ambiguities, and leaves no question unanswered. Therefore, it resembles more to 
the technological strand of contemporary culture (Marsden, 1991: 118), where ambiguities are 
(theoretically) easily overcome by a glimpse at the user’s manual, or whatever book one has 
at their disposal.9  
 Mainline evangelicals, on the other hand, have a much softer outlook on the issue. 
They, too, like fundamentalists, reject the evolution theory. But even in states like Alabama, 
Mississippi, and South Carolina, which have large actively Christian populations, state 
universities go on teaching such disciplines as astronomy, genetics, geology, and 
palaeontology with no worries about conflicting biblical account. To most evangelicals, there 
is nothing wrong with this setting. And unlike fundamentalists, they do not wish to change it. 
“The pragmatism of U.S. culture combines with the somewhat anti-intellectual cast of 
evangelical religion to create a very broad public tolerance for what, to some, might seem an 
intolerable level of cognitive dissonance.” What evangelicals cannot stand, however, is what 
they call “scientism”: the effort to teach evolution or any subject in such a way as to leave no 
room for God’s existence or activity (Mead, 2006).  
 The modern intelligent design movement, much like its predecessor in the 19th century 
holds that, there are certain features of the universe and of living things that cannot be 
explained as work of pure luck or as a result of an undirected process, such as natural 
selection. Therefore, Darwinian theory cannot explain in entirety either the origin of life or 
                                               
8
 In his call to the “American Atheist Forum” to discuss the relationship between faith and reason, Dr. Ergün 
Caner (a Turkish muslim-origin US citizen who converted to evangelicalism in his youth, and who also happens 
to be the “President of Theological Seminary” in Jerry Falwell’s (see p. 42) Liberty University), says: 
“You asked for Christians to prove what we believe. So we accept this challenge. If you want answers, we’ll 
give them to you. Invite your most brilliant colleagues and we’ll bring ours. We only ask three things: 1) that we 
all follow the rules of logic 2) that we agree that the Bible is an old book and 3) that we treat each other 
respectfully” (http://www.liberty.edu/academics/religion/seminary/index.cfm?PID=13278) (emphasis added). 
9
 More revealing is the fact that many of the leaders of the creation science movement are engineers or work in 
various fields of applied science (Marsden, 1991: 119).  
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the emergence of species. To do that, one needs to understand and accept that such a complex 
system cannot have been established by itself.  
 Orthodox scientists dismiss intelligent design as “upmarket creationism.” But this did 
not prevent the movement from obtaining several victories against what some call “neo-
Darwinists.” For example, in October 2002, Ohio state legislature passed a law that 
established “science standards” that required students to “know how scientists continue to 
investigate and critically analyze aspects of evolutionary theory.” In Cobb Country, Georgia, 
a school district now urges teachers to let their students know the “disputed views” about 
evolution. Furthermore, the conservative republicans managed to attach a passage urging, 
though not forcing, schools to teach “the full range of scientific views” (Micklethwait and 
Woolridge, 2005: 159). 
 Once again, this attitude on the Christian right’s part can be linked to its growing 
willingness to fight against their persecutors; the liberal “science establishment,” which has so 
far given little ground to conservatives especially on the issue of intelligent design (op. cit., p. 
160), so much so that they are subject to constant mockery.10 And yet again, the radical 
faction of the religious right finds itself degraded, its ideas refuted, its values ignored by the 
liberal establishment.  
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 In 2004, the Kansas Board of Education decided to hold debates on evolutionary theory and on which 
alternative theories may be included to the curriculum. As response to the decision, a physics graduate named 
Bobby Henderson established the “Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster” and wrote an open letter to the 
Board, parts of which include: 
“I am writing you with much concern after having read of your hearing to decide 
whether the alternative theory of Intelligent Design should be taught along with the 
theory of Evolution […] Let us remember that there are multiple theories of Intelligent 
Design. I and many others around the world are of the strong belief that the universe 
was created by a Flying Spaghetti Monster. It was He who created all that we see and 
all that we feel. We feel strongly that the overwhelming scientific evidence pointing 
towards evolutionary processes is nothing but a coincidence, put in place by Him” 
(http://www.venganza.org/about/open-letter/ ).  
The mockery attracted many who oppose the Board’s decision. Still, in June 2005 the board put out a set of new 
science standards that required  critical analysis of Darwin’s theory, along with evidence that disproved it. 
However, in early 2007, new science standards were agreed upon, and those did not contain any reference to 
creation science (http://www.ksde.org/Default.aspx?tabid=144 ).  
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2.2.3. Various Other Issues 
As noted in the previous sections, decisions taken by the Supreme Court on religious issues 
are widely unpopular among the conservatives. And especially since Roe vs. Wade, the issue 
has stayed on the top of their agenda. Their aim on this matter, along with various others 
linked to the Court, is to replace those judges they perceive as liberals with more conservative 
ones (Rosenberg and Sinderbrand, 2004). 
 The Supreme Court may have put Bush in the White House after the 2000 elections, 
but since then, it has also stroke down bans against gay sex, and agreed to hear a case brought 
by the prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay, two decisions which are both very “liberal” 
(Micklethwait and Woolridge, 2005: 386). But looking to the past, the Court has a much more 
liberal record: In 1962, it barred prayer from public schools; in 1964, it made the prosecution 
of obscenity much more difficult; in 1965, it legalized the sale of contraceptive devices and 
medicines; and in 1973, it established abortion as a constitutional right (op. cit., p. 65). 
Naturally, with the presence of such a powerful institution which apparently keeps a certain 
distance between itself and the hard line conservatives, the Christian right sees no option but 
to help like-minded judges to get appointed. In its current form, the Supreme Court constitutes 
one of the pillars of the “liberal establishment”, arguably the strongest one. And since the late 
nineteenth century, whenever fundamentalists tried to alter things considered fundamental, it 
keeps on smashing their cases. 
 Another issue that the Christian right cherishes is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Above we had touched upon two creeds that the evangelicals hold: that United States of 
America is the “new Israel,” that is, a brand new Holy Land (see p.20); and that the rebirth of 
Jesus Christ will take place in the area where we now know as Israel (see p.23). Therefore, 
evangelicals are experiencing a two-fold identification with the Israelis. The latter are a nation 
of settlers and newcomers, just like the former. And the Israelis, furthermore, should be 
protected, their well being must be ensured, for they occupy the lands where the Second 
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Coming will happen. It must be noted here that the Israeli lobby, too, affects the conduct of 
American foreign policy in the Middle East to a certain degree. But it isn’t as much as its 
exaggerated in theories about a Zionist conspiracy, and is surely less than the role played by 
evangelicals’ pressure on the formation of foreign policy attitudes towards Israel and 
Palestine (The Economist, 2006: No: 8495).  
 Evangelicals’ influence on foreign policy does not stop there. Currently they are also 
actively pursuing international humanitarian causes like sex trafficking, the civil war in 
Sudan, North Korea’s oppression of its own citizens, international debt relief, and AIDS. To 
many, this recent interest on foreign issues on evangelicals’ part came as an anomaly, since 
they were so far known for their isolationist attitude. The main thing here is that as the 
evangelical formulation climbed up to include middle class Americans, and those new 
megachurch members wanted to deal with problems that are more dramatic then abortion or 
evolution. Also, while at the beginning of the 20th century, 80 percent of world’s Christians 
lived in Europe and in America, today 60 percent of them are in the developing world. “More 
Presbyterians go to church in Ghana than in Scotland.” America’s evangelicals, as their faith 
preaches, are eager to gather souls in these new places. For example, in 2002, the Southern 
Baptist Convention spent $290 million abroad. With that sum, it established 8369 churches 
and baptized 421,436 souls. Meanwhile, the missionaries who visit those places return home 
shocked because of the poverty and diseases they have encountered (The Economist, 2005: 
No: 8433). 
 
Today’s American conservatism is a strong one, and this strength derives mainly from two 
sources: its immense network of organizations; and the masses of volunteers who summon 
people to vote, hand out flyers, go to far places of the world to evangelize, donate time and 
money, and basically, devote themselves to the cause and fight. The evangelicals and the 
fundamentalists may be a minority compared with the overall population. Yet they make up 
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for their relatively small numbers with their absolute superiority on political awareness and 
eagerness to struggle. On all the causes they embark, eventually they become the losing side. 
Because, apparently, winning or losing do not constitute ends in themselves. Actually, being 
the losing side seems to work much better for evangelicals since, obviously, it’s the struggle 
that keeps them going. If someday, they were to win, and therefore turn America into a much 
more religious country, or a plain theocracy (as the fundamentalists would have it to be), they 
would probably be much worse than losers-they would be lost. As is the case with utopias, the 
American Protestant evangelical utopia will never be realized, and its elusiveness will push 
the Christian right to struggle even more. And presumably, they will continue to whine and 
utter their victimhood and be happy about it, because it seems to be the struggle itself that 
makes their lives meaningful. 
 Following September 11, this utopian understanding of the world has been intensified 
with the overuse of the words “good” and “evil” both by the conservatives and the head of the 
American administration.  
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3. SEPTEMBER 11 and DIVINE INTERVENTION 
The radical nationalism of the religious Right naturally emerged particularly strongly 
after 9/11 and fused with religious hostility to Islam as a religion. Bush himself was 
bitterly criticized by sections of the religious Right for his speech of September 17, 
2001, at the Islamic Center in Washington Praising Islam as a “religion of peace.” 
Franklin Graham, son of Billy Graham, called Islam “very evil and wicked, violent 
and not of the same God.” Jerry Falwell described Mohammed as a terrorist - remarks 
from which Bush officially distanced himself and the administration. Hal Lindsey 
(author of the best-selling book in American history after the Bible) produced a 
strikingly hate-filled work which combined Christian and radical Israeli sources to 
vilify Islam in general. The effect of such rhetoric on the outside world has been 
severe (Lieven, 2005: 143). 
Such was the dominant, or rather, outspoken aspect of the religious atmosphere in America 
right after the September 11 attacks; one of intolerance and hatred against Islam. Though 
some were reactive to the president for his friendly attitude towards Muslims, others were 
complaining of his frequent use of the word “evil” and his apparent understanding of people 
as good vs. evil, or white vs. black, leaving no room for grey zones.  
 Before investigating religion’s role on George W. Bush’s domestic and foreign 
policies, we must first analyze the effect that the 9/11 attacks had on American people, for 
this was the event that marked his presidency. 
 
3.1. American Reality, (Un)Interrupted by the Intrusion of the Real 
Aside from personal shock, the immediate response of the Americans to the attacks was to 
assert their patriotism and solidarity. As happens at times of big national troubles, most 
people went to church. Most major faith communities agreed with the government that some 
degree of military force had to be used to bring the perpetrators to justice and to prevent 
possible future attacks. However, most of these also warned that military action, if applied, 
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should be done so with limitations and in order to “restore peace and uphold justice” but not 
in a “spirit of vengeance.”   
 Yet among those faith communities that spoke out in the face of a US attack on 
Afghanistan, the evangelical leaders, both white and black, were the most powerful 
denunciators of terrorists and most ardent supporters of military action. Richard Land, the 
director of the Southern Baptist Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, declared on 
September 21, 2001, that “This is a defensive war. We’ve been attacked, and our citizens have 
been slaughtered, and they will continue to die in the hundreds if not thousands unless we 
attack these terrorists and remove their safe havens and places of refuge.” Similarly, on 
September 16, the black Pentecostal bishop T.D. Jakes preached: “Let Osama bin Laden and 
whosoever shall rise against this nation understand that we have not dropped to our knees 
because we are defeated, but […] because we are armed and dangerous and ready to fight the 
good fight of faith” (Reichley, 2002: 347). 
 During the first couple of months after 9/11, the American public not only showed 
overwhelming support for the administration’s war, but also expressed confidence in the 
nation’s overall moral conduct. According to a Fox News poll in December 2001, 59 percent 
of the respondents thought that the nation was morally on “the right direction,” as opposed to 
a half as big 29 percent who thought that the nation was on the wrong way. Similar results 
were obtained from other polls. This sense of moral rejuvenation was to a large extent linked 
to religion. In November, the Pew Research Center found that the proportion of people who 
believed that religion was increasing its influence in America had risen from 40 percent to 78 
percent. The president apparently was responsible for this change, as he repeatedly identified 
the war against terrorism with religious terms, as when he stated in early 2002 and “the God 
of the universe struggles with us.”  
 Later in 2002, the share of the public “satisfied with the way things are going in this 
country” dropped to 50 percent from 65 percent in January. And the ratio of those who 
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believe that religion’s influence was increasing had fallen to 37 percent. Yet the indications 
were telling that almost half of the population thought that the decrease in religion’s influence 
was not good on its own (as among the 55 percent who believed that religion was losing 
influence, 84 percent said that this was “a bad thing”). And while 67 percent believed that 
America was a “Christian nation,” 84 percent also believed that “a person can be a good 
American even if he doesn’t have a religious faith.” And finally, after the attacks, only a small   
22 percent said they held an unfavourable opinion of Muslim Americans (op. cit., p.349).  
 Apparently, after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Americans’ growing 
inclination towards the (religious) right of the political spectrum gained strength. With this 
catastrophe that came out of nowhere, it is also possible that the evangelical and 
fundamentalist religious right found a base on which to display its militancy and willingness 
to act, while, as argued above, mainstream denominations gave messages that are more 
moderate and reserved. As a result of this, the evangelicals’ “good vs. bad” echoed perfectly 
with parts of the American people, which was, following the attacks, going through a 
traumatic phase, as any other nation would. It should also be noted here that this absolutist 
language was also discovered by the Neo-conservatives, who, after 9/11 had finally persuaded 
top officials of the administration, including the president, to give ear to them (Kepel, 
2004:5). 
 
In understanding what September 11 might mean to the American people, Slavoj Zizek offers 
a different approach. His argument starts with the observation that in today’s market, “we find 
a whole series of products deprived of their malignant properties: coffee without caffeine, 
cream without fat, beer without alcohol.” The list, accordingly, could even be extended to 
multiculturalism, where the other gets deprived of its otherness. The same is being done to 
reality here: just like decaffeinated coffee smells and tastes like coffee, but is not real coffee, 
virtual reality is experienced as reality without being so. And the virtualization of the collapse 
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of WTC towers through the oft-repeated shots of airplanes crashing into the buildings and of 
the people running in havoc towards the camera is “reminiscent of spectacular shots in 
catastrophe movies, a special effect which outdid all others, since […] reality is the best 
appearance of itself.” From here follows the logical conclusion that the aim of the perpetrators 
was indeed this spectacular effect, not to provoke material damage (Zizek, 2002:11). 
 Americans were in no way alien to scenes of catastrophe or appalling destruction; 
they’ve been reproducing such images (along with contextual scenarios) for some decades 
now through big-budget Hollywood movies. By the time the attacks took place, those 
artificial images from movies, along with the context in which they were represented had 
already taken their place in the collective American memory. In other words, in September 
11, 2001, “the unthinkable which happened was the object of fantasy, so that, in a way, 
America got what it fantasized about, and that was the biggest surprise.” The surprise effect, 
on the other hand, largely stemmed from the fact that in the reality that the Americans were 
living in, all these horrific images they fantasized about could not have taken place in 
America. They could happen in a movie, or in a news report from a troubled Third World 
country – but not here in the States. Hence, when the attacks came, it was not as if the 
Americans had experienced a rude awakening from their long dream, but quite the opposite: it 
was fantasy that came smashing into their reality and disrupted it (op. cit., p. 16).  
 America had two choices in the aftermath of the attacks. Either, it would “finally risk 
stepping through the fantasmatic screen that separates it from the Outside World, accepting its 
arrival in the Real World, making the long-overdue move from ‘A thing like this shouldn’t 
happen here!’ to ‘A thing like this shouldn’t happen anywhere!’” In order to come to terms 
with the realization of its most horrible fantasies, America would also have to accept that its 
vulnerability is a part of its reality, and enact “the punishment of those responsible [of the 
attacks] as a sad duty, not as an exhilarating retaliation.” Or, alternatively, it would stay 
within the limits of its real world of fantasy, where disaster can only happen in the movies or 
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the Third World. To protect this “fantasmatic screen” then, it would also have to be much 
more aggressive towards the threatening Outside World, and swift and merciless in its 
punishment of the attackers (op. cit., p. 49).  
 Seeing the nightmarish state of Iraq, and the continuously inconclusive fighting in 
Afghanistan, one tends to think that America has chosen the second way. The question here 
is, why. Part of the answer could be found in the conditions of the period. In 2001, George W. 
Bush had almost completed a year in presidency, but the reforms he had promised prior to the 
elections had not yet gained momentum. Also, he was the man seen by the conservatives as 
Bill Clinton’s antithesis. He had mass support from the religious right, along with its two 
distinctive leaders, Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson (Benen, 2000). Furthermore, as we have 
seen, within this new religious right, the social and cultural visibility and influence of the 
evangelicals was on the rise. As they are much more literal and diehard followers of 
Protestantism than mainline believers,  in the aftermath of the attacks, they were trying to 
understand how come such “good people” as the Americans could be attacked, and therefore 
reasoned that this must be an act done by truly “evil” people. Meanwhile, in the need to 
retaliate, George W. Bush found a purpose for his presidency, a much greater mission of 
bringing freedom to the persecuted and wiping out evil from the face of the earth (Singer, 
2004). Part of the responsibility for such an understanding of foreign policy surely goes to the 
neocons, who, from very early on had the idea of bringing democracy to the oppressed of the 
world, particularly those in the Middle East. After the attacks, they found a president in crisis, 
and persuaded him to listen to their plan of actions; while on the level of the people, they had 
a religious right with whom their rhetoric and political aims resonated almost perfectly 
(Micklethwait and Woolridge, 2005). 
 The nature of Americans’ reaction to 9/11 (mainly, an outburst of patriotism and 
jingoism), therefore, is rooted in the fusion of a number of phenomena. As the attacks stroke 
the WTC towers and the Pentagon (two pillars of American power, the third being the White 
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House), the rising religious right, along with most Americans perceived this as the work of a 
bunch of evil men, without considering the possible underlying causes of terrorism, and 
therefore, chose to stay within their reality as composed of the idea of an invulnerable 
America. The attacks, on the other hand, gave the president a much larger purpose than petty 
issues of domestic policy, namely; the eradication of evil in the form of terrorism from the 
earth. And finally, this atmosphere was very suitable for the neocons to sell their aims at both 
foreign and domestic policies, which had this idealistic and utopian taste both in rhetoric and 
content.  
 Within this process, the role played by the president was highly influential and 
effective on the shape of the outcome. In order to have a deeper understanding of the problem, 
further analysis of faith’s weight on his policy choices and the nature of his personal relation 
to religion is required. 
 
3.2. Messenger of God: George W. Bush  
George W. Bush angered many for the tone of the rhetoric he used after the 9/11 attacks. 
Following certain remarks that he made, he had begun to be widely seen as an arrogant figure 
who thinks he is doing God’s will on earth. As argued below, his “crusade” gaff (see p 53.) 
made Muslims throughout the world feel extremely uneasy, while his prayers for being 
“God’s messenger” (see p.57) was deeply disturbing to seculars. Whether or not his religious 
faith played a role in his administration’s decision to attack Iraq, too, was an issue on which 
he was faced with harsh criticism. 
 It is to his rhetoric and relation with faith we shall turn to now.   
 
3.2.1. Bush the Second    
George W. Bush rises ahead of the dawn most days, when the loudest sound outside 
the White House is the dull, distant roar of F-16s patrolling the skies. Even before he 
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brings his wife, Laura, a morning cup of coffee, he goes off to a quiet place to read 
alone. His text isn't news summaries or the overnight intelligence dispatches. Those 
are for later, downstairs, in the Oval Office. It's not recreational reading (recently, a 
biography of Sandy Koufax). Instead, he's told friends, it's a book of evangelical mini-
sermons, "My Utmost for His Highest." The author is Oswald Chambers, and, under 
the circumstances, the historical echoes are loud. A Scotsman and itinerant Baptist 
preacher, Chambers died in November 1917 as he was bringing the Gospel to 
Australian and New Zealand soldiers massed in Egypt. By Christmas they had helped 
to wrest Palestine from the Turks, and captured Jerusalem for the British Empire at the 
end of World War I (Fineman, Lipper, Brant, Smalley, Wolffe, 2003). 
Those reading sessions were taking place a couple of weeks before the launching of the Iraq 
War. What was it that led the American President to read that particular book in that particular 
time and context? Why did he seek advice in that kind of a source, which ultimately preached 
that “When you are up against difficulties, you have no power, you can only endure in 
darkness,” and then you should “go right out of yourself, and deliberately turn your 
imagination to God” (op. cit.). 
There are three main accounts as to how Bush’s faith evolved. The first of these refers 
to a speech he had with long time family friend reverend Billy Graham in 1985. Graham is a 
famous and widely admired Baptist evangelist whose name is frequently cited with reference 
to Bush’s religious creed. According to Bush, Graham had planted a “mustard seed” in his 
soul that eventually led him to “recommit my [his] heart to Jesus Christ.” With regard to 
evangelical understanding, this account does not fully reflect the “drama of a single moment 
when Bush accepted Jesus as his savior, a true born-again experience” (Cooperman, 2004). 
Bush, too, did not call himself a “born-again,” arguing that, to him, being so refers to a 
particular moment, whereas he sees himself as being on a journey. He doesn’t identify with 
the word “evangelical” either, a term which, he argues, implies a duty to proselytize, which 
would not be acceptable for a public officeholder. Also, he claims that his faith was 
“reconfirmed,” or that he experienced a “renewal of faith” (Cannon, 2004). Obviously, he 
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tried to distance himself from the idea that his reunion with or tighter embrace of faith was 
one that could be explained by evangelist terminology.   
The second account involves another evangelist called Arthur Blessitt, an original 
figure who is known for dragging a 12-foot cross around the world. According to this version 
of events, more than a year before the meeting with Billy Graham, Bush wanted to talk with 
Blessitt. The two men met in a restaurant, and Blessitt explained Bush how his soul can be 
saved. At the end of their conversation, they held each others hands, and prayed for Bush’s 
salvation. Evidently, this sounds much more like a “born-again” sort of experience than his 
talk with Graham. But this experience did not appear in Bush’s autobiography, and he has not 
referred to it since. It appears that Bush carefully avoids giving any hint which could make it 
easier for others (both the religious right and the left) to label him as evangelist. Still, this 
does not stop evangelical leaders from calling him one of their own (Cooperman, 2004).  
The last and arguably the most reliable account refers not to any specific contact with 
a revered evangelical figure, but to a period in Bush’s life. In 1977, George W. Bush married 
Laura Lane Welch. Together, they joined Laura’s Methodist church. Soon after, Bush became 
a “respected member of the congregation.” But he was also notorious for his drinking 
problem, which predated his marriage. It didn’t take long for his wife to see that he was 
determined to keep this reputation. By 1985, they had had two children –twin daughters- and 
Laura Bush had run out of patience with her husband’s drinking problem.  
At this period, a close friend of his, Don Evans (also secretary of commerce form 2001 
to 2005), enters the scene. He introduced Bush to a nondenominational Bible-study group 
called Community Bible Study (CBS). This small convention was in fact a “scriptural boot 
camp,” where a group of 10 men would study intensively a single book of the New Testament 
for a year long. So for two years, Bush and Evans delved into detailed reading and discussion, 
each week going through a new chapter. This dense relationship with Christian faith would 
affect Bush in several ways. It gave him, for the first time, something to focus on 
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intellectually. Though he had studied in Yale and Harvard, he was “a jogger and marathoner 
for years,” and he had stayed relatively far from the intellectual environment that surrounded 
him. The Bible study group provided him with the mental and spiritual discipline that he had 
probably never experienced and needed desperately to quit drinking. Finally, in 1986, and 
thanks largely to CBS, he broke the habit. Bush never sought rehabilitation to get rid of his 
addiction, and therefore he never called himself an alcoholic. But as it turned out, the CBS 
had been something of a support group for him, where he concentrated on an inspiring text 
with a group of other men who were also seeking shelter in their hard times. And from then 
on, it was “Goodbye Jack Daniels, hello Jesus” (Fineman, Lipper, Brant, Smalley, Wolffe, 
2003). 
In 1987, Bush went to Washington to help run his father’s campaign. There, he took 
on the job of being the “liaison” to the religious right. While his father was uneasy with 
religious types, George W. was much more comfortable with them, Doug Wead who worked 
with him on the evangelical outreach said “George knew exactly what to say, what to do” (op. 
cit.). This “one of us” kind of attitude would prove to be useful also later in his life, when he 
ran for presidency. During a Republican primary debate in 1999, Bush was asked which 
“political philosopher thinker” he most identified with. “Christ,” he replied, “because he 
changed my heart.” Meanwhile, Richard Land, president of the Southern Baptist Convention 
was watching the debate at home on tv. He had his wife and daughter along with him; both 
having little interest in politics. But when they heard Bush’s reply to the question, they both 
stopped what they were doing and said “Wow!” According to Land, they were not alone, 
because “most evangelicals who heard the question probably thought, ‘That’s exactly the way 
I would have answered that’” (Cannon, 2004). 
 Bush and Karl Rove (his long time campaign manager) built their careers on 
this base of faith, with Rove making the policy and Bush doing the talking. A year before he 
ran for governor, in 1993, Bush told a Jewish reporter that only those who believed in Jesus 
 59 
could go to heaven. Although this produced a stir, it also helped him gather a constituency in 
the rural and so far primarily Democratic Texas. As a candidate, Bush got advice from 
pastors, leaders of nondenominational megachurches in the suburbs. His ideas for governing 
had connotations of faith, and were designed to draw vote from evangelicals. Yet in the same 
time, secular voters saw him as a moderate. Therefore, George W. Bush had been successful 
where his father had failed, and achieved to “reach the base without threatening the rest.” In 
the Republican primaries in 1999, while other candidates tried to win evangelicals by 
pledging alliance to issues such as abortion and gay rights, Bush used a different tactic that 
one of his rivals, Gary Bauer, calls, “identity politics.” According to Bauer, “Bush talked 
about his faith, and people just believed him – and believed in him.” He was “one of them” 
(Fineman, Lipper, Brant, Smalley, Wolffe, 2003).  
However, Bush’s emphasis on religious faith during his presidential campaign should 
not be seen as an attitude unique to him, or to the republicans, for that matter. During his own 
campaign, Al Gore did not refrain from proclaiming himself a “born-again Christian.” He also 
told to Washington Post that he often asks himself “W.W.J.D.” – a motto popular among 
Christian youth meaning “what would Jesus do?” This rhetoric of faith was also used by the 
Democratic vice president candidate. Joseph Lieberman, Gore’s running candidate and an 
orthodox Jew, surprised the audience when he opened his first campaign address in Tennessee 
with a prayer and a quotation from the biblical Book of Chronicles. Lieberman made use of 
these religious themes throughout the campaign. In Detroit, he told an audience, “As a people, 
we need to reaffirm our faith and renew the dedication of our nation and ourselves to God and 
God’s purposes.” And finally, a month after this last statement that seemed to come from 
Bush, as he was addressing an audience of university students, he argued that “the 
constitution guarantees freedom of religion, not freedom from religion” (Benen, 2000). 
Meanwhile, Bush was also keeping on with his campaign, which he had kicked off in 
the Bob Jones University in South Carolina. This was a fundamentalist university whose 
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leadership had banned interracial dating, called the Pope “the Antichrist,” and labelled the 
Catholic Church as a “satanic cult” (op. cit.). Although this wasn’t exactly a moderate move, 
he didn’t stray from his strategy of not to identify with the evangelicals. During his address at 
Bob Jones, when a student asked him whether he had been called by God, he became “visibly 
irritated,” and said, “I don’t know what God’s will is, and neither do you” (Baker, 2000). Yet 
his moderate mood did not stop him from proclaiming June 10 as “Jesus Day” in Texas 
(Benen, 2000).  
 In an interview with U.S. News and World Report, Bush is quoted to say, “I’m not all 
that comfortable describing my faith, because in the political world, there are a lot of people 
who say, ‘Vote for me; I’m more religious than my opponent.’ And those kind of folks make 
me a little nervous” (Cannon, 2004). Then during the 2000 campaign, Gore must have made 
Bush nervous, as he made more campaign appearances in churches than the future president. 
Yet all the talk of religion on the Democratic candidate’s part was to no avail. Bush had 
already ensured the backing of the evangelical leaders, by quietly assembling a “values 
defense team,” which included prominent people of the religious right. So when the election 
day came, ABC’s exit poll showed that 14 percent of voters identified themselves as members 
of the religious right, and 80 percent of these voted for Bush (Benen, 2000).  
 The rise of the religious right, and having established their backing, after all, helped 
George W. Bush win the election. What is to be remembered here, however, is that Bush has 
continuously sent messages of moderation and refrained from identifying with neither 
evangelicals nor fundamentalists. This carefully designed balance made him beat Al Gore 
(who was widely seen as the “next president”) on the ballot box. Come 2004, he had angered 
and offended many, but the religious right did not pull its support, and helped him win again. 
In the last election, almost 60 percent of Bush’s votes came from the hard-line section of the 
religious right. However, after the 2000 election, they were waiting something in return; 
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banning abortion, gay marriage, letting intelligent design into the curriculum, etc. Now we 
must turn to how much Bush paid them back (The Economist, 2006, No: 8495). 
 
3.2.2. The Battle of Good vs. Evil: Rhetoric and Policies in the Post-9/11 Period  
And we understand. And the American people are beginning to understand. This 
crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while (Davison, 2005: 133). 
When he used the word “crusade,” it was not the first time that Bush made a speech with 
religious connotations. The remark triggered harsh reaction and criticism from around the 
world, and not only from Islamic countries, but also from liberals and moderates in the U.S. 
and Europe. The administration lost no time in playing down the remark, arguing that the 
president’s purpose was “to cultivate patience for what he was calling ‘the new wars of the 
21st century’” (op. cit., p. 133). But no matter what the White House said, Bush’s blunder was 
perceived to be the first sign of his desire to launch an all out war against Islam. This was 
especially worrying for Muslims. And Bush did not hesitate to do whatever he deemed 
necessary to reassure them that he admires Islam. He hosted Ramadan dinners, met with 
prominent Muslim leaders, and continuously criticized evangelical figures who denounce 
Islam as a corrupt religion (Fineman, Lipper, Brant, Smalley, Wolffe, 2003). When highly 
influential evangelical fundamentalist figures that supported Bush before and after the 
elections such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson made comments that scorned Islam, Bush 
put a distance between them and his administration. At the anger of many of his supporters, 
he said that Muslims worship the same God as the Christians. Right after September 11, he 
visited a mosque as a show of goodwill, and said, “We do not impose any religion; we 
welcome all religions [...] We do not prescribe any prayer; we welcome all prayers” (The 
Economist, 2004, No: 8406).  
 By looking at what the president has done to ease the minds of Muslims, an alternative 
interpretation on the use of the word “crusade” could be mentioned here. According to the 
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Oxford dictionary, the word, as a noun, has two meanings: 1) “any of a series of medieval 
military expeditions made by Europeans to recover the Holy Land from the Muslims,” and,  
2) “an energetic organized campaign with a political, social, or religious aim: a crusade 
against crime.”11 It could be argued that in his infamous remark, the president may have 
aimed at using the word in its second meaning, in order to emphasize the enormous size and 
lengthy duration of the fight that he was going to make the nation embark upon. It seems 
illogical that someone like Bush who carefully sold himself as a moderate would in a glimpse 
turn fundamentalist and make remarks that would obviously antagonize not only the Muslim 
voters who had campaigned for him before the 2000 election (Benen, 2000), but also make 
him lose the support of liberals and moderate conservative throughout the country. Yet, the 
obvious criticism to this interpretation would be that if that remark is a result of carelessness 
on the president’s and/or his speechwriter’s part, how can they be so careless in writing such 
an important speech that to use a word which will clearly have very disturbing implications to 
many people, especially considering the context of September 11’s aftermath.  
 Another disturbing aspect of Bush’s rhetoric, and arguably the most disturbing, is his 
frequent mention of “good” and “evil,” and his definition of the “war against terror” as a 
battle between good and evil. Even among evangelicals there were some who criticized this 
language (Lamp man, 2003). Since 9/11, he has spend barely if ever a day without using the 
word “evil.” His “axis of evil” was not one of evil initially. When David Frum, one of his 
speechwriters, came up with the term “axis of hatred”, he sent it to chief speechwriter Michael 
Garson, who wanted to use “the theological language that Bush had made his own since 
September 11.” So, “axis of hatred” became “axis of evil” (Progressive, 2003, No: 2). Frum 
argues that the “language of good and evil” came by naturally. Accordingly, the president 
used the term “evildoers” for the terrorists from very early on. At the period, some 
commentators were wondering aloud whether the U.S. in some way could have deserved the 
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 Emphasis in the original. Source: http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/crusade?view=uk 
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attacks. But the president wanted to “cut that off right away”, because he didn’t want the 
American public to think not even for a second that they could have some relation to the 
breeding of terrorism. Another reason why he used that word was to imply that he saw no 
moral equivalent to the September 11 attacks. Osama Bin Laden and his followers were 
“evil.” And in November 2001 in an interview with Newsweek, he declared for the first time 
Saddam Hussein was evil, too (Fineman, Lipper, Brant, Smalley, Wolffe, 2003).  
 While this rhetoric of the war between “good and evil” aims at silencing the view that 
America may have any responsibility in the emerging Al Qaeda as a destabilizing actor, on 
the other hand, it damages Bush’s argument that the war against terror has no religious 
meaning. “Evil” certainly has many secular meanings, too, but the president’s usage of it look 
distinctly religiously conceived. At the Pentagon memorial service, he claimed that they, the 
Americans “cannot fully understand the designs and power of evil. […] It is enough to know 
that evil, like goodness, exists. And in the terrorists, evil has found a willing servant.” On 
November 10, 2001, as he addressed to those gathered at UN, he said “We’re confident that 
history has an author who fills time and eternity with His purpose. We know that evil is real, 
but good will prevail against it. This is the teaching of many faiths, and in that assurance we 
gain strength for a long journey” (Davison, 2005: 135).The last sentence here is particularly 
important, whereby Bush bluntly backs America’s war with purely theological arguments. 
Also, he’s making out of the terrorists almost a supreme being whose capabilities, methods 
and motives we cannot understand. Such an outlook doubtlessly declares any effort to 
understand why the attacks took place as a struggle in vain; terrorists are evil people who 
work and think in ways good people cannot understand, and their only aim is to harm good 
people. Additionally, in Bush’s words where he says that his argument is “the teaching of 
many faiths,” there is an all-knowing, inter-religions statement. In saying that he speaks for 
many religions, he not only claims comprehensive knowledge on these faiths, but he also 
implies that the war against terror is not sacred only to the Americans, but to most of the 
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world’s population, because according to their faiths, too, fighting terrorists is a cause for 
goodness.  
 A theological criticism of the idea of opposing the evil argues that in aiming at ridding 
the world of evil, Americans’ consideration of themselves as the “good side” in the fight is 
problematic in two ways; first, it adopts the line of thinking that the Al Qaeda seems to have 
in its hatred of America, and second, “it completely neglects the teaching of Christ that only 
one can properly be called good which is God. A Christian account of the good can never 
simply identify this or that particular polity, or set of actions, let alone a national strategy of 
pre-emptive warfare, as unambiguously good”. Therefore, from a Christian theological 
perspective, claiming pure “good” upon one’s actions, or policy choices is simply arrogant. 
Also, the war on terror does not qualify to fit the standards of Christian doctrine of “just war,” 
for this doctrine requires that the ruler that declares the war must ensure that the “war will not 
bring about a greater evil than the avoidance of war” ((Northolt, 2004). Although it is open to 
debate whether a ruler can make such commitments as requested by the doctrine, still, from a 
just war perspective and judging by the situation in Iraq, the war on terror is arguably among 
the least just of all wars. 
 Frequent criticism of Bush’s religious rhetoric also pointed at his tendency to see his 
actions as doing God’s work on earth. When he says that he prayed “for the strength to do 
God’s will” in Iraq, and adds that he will not justify the war based on religious arguments, he 
contradicts himself. He also prays to be “as god a messenger of his [God’s] will as possible.” 
(Cooperman, 2004). And this contradiction gives way to interpretations that the president 
claims “divine political backing” for the war on terror.” (Braun, 2006). And he only adds 
weight to these suspicions when, asked if he had consulted his father before invading Iraq, he 
says; “There’s a higher Father that I appeal to” (Dunmore, 2005).  
 Still, emphasis is also put upon the idea that Bush is not as radical as he seems to be; 
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Bush has spoken publicly of being "on bended knee" in prayer. So did Wilson. Bush 
said he consults the Bible regularly. Jimmy Carter did it nightly. In a speech to the 
troops on the eve of the invasion of Iraq, Bush asked for God's blessing on the 
enterprise. Franklin D. Roosevelt, who once instructed a speechwriter to make sure to 
include "the God stuff," led the entire nation in prayer on the occasion of D-Day. Bush 
seems to find God's hand in the war he is waging; Lincoln told his Cabinet that he 
considered the victory at Antietam a sign from the Almighty telling him to issue the 
Emancipation Proclamation. Bush addresses the National Prayer Breakfast each year 
(and has added the National Hispanic Prayer Breakfast), but so has every president 
since Dwight D. Eisenhower (Cannon, 2004). 
With regard to the invasion of Iraq, in late April 2003, he said that the decision to go to war 
“is a decision I made based upon what I thought were the best interests of the American 
people. I was able to step back from religion, because I have a job to do. And I, on bended 
knee to the good Lord, asked him to help me to do my job in a way that’s wise” (op. cit.).  
 Even though it did not withdraw and maybe even widened its support for him, the 
religious right did not really get so far what it asked from the Bush presidency. For example, 
while he frequently used the term “culture of life” (a catch phrase that signifies the anti-
abortion campaign), unlike evangelical leaders, he never said that abortion is plain murder. 
According to his aides, he never said that it should be illegal, and he certainly did not try to 
ban the practice. By using terms such as this one, Bush may be giving the conservatives the 
message that he is with them, while avoiding to take radical steps that would alienate 
moderate voters. On the issue of gay marriage, Bush says that he opposes it because marriage 
is an institution so fundamental to society that it should not be altered. Evangelicals, on the 
other hand, want to ban it, on grounds that “it is against God’s will.” Bush never said that, and 
did not stray from the secular argument. He also carefully avoided to choose between 
creationism and Darwinism. In 2000, he suggested that creationism should be taught together 
with the theory of evolution since “religion has been around a lot longer than Darwinism.”  
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But he added with a rather vague fashion that he believes that God created the world, and that 
everyday we’re getting new information as to how he created it” (Cooperman, 2004). 
 In relying on less divisive evangelical figures after Falwell’s and Robertson’s 
notorious remarks (Rosenberg, Sinderbrand, 2004), in showing enthusiasm for a trade 
agreement with China (whom the evangelicals oppose of persecuting Christians), and in 
visiting an Islamic religious center just within a week of September 11 attacks (The 
Economist, 2004, No: 8495), Bush did not hesitate in clashing with the religious right. Some 
conservatives have begun to realize that the president does not always (and maybe even 
rarely) follow the religious rights’ agenda. That’s why Paul Weyrich from the conservative 
Free Congress Foundation says, “We’d better be very careful not to think that the president 
owes us anything and it’s payback time” (Rosenberg, Sinderbrand, 2004).  
  
Bush’s frequent reliance on religious rhetoric in an age where, especially in most of the 
remaining developed countries, the power of Christianity wanes, is surprising to many. 
Combined with the rise of religious right in the U.S., his “god-talk” becomes frightening to 
secularists everywhere, leading to interpretations that he is going to start a clash of 
civilizations. But analysis shows that, in spite of his speeches that are heavily decorated with 
religious themes, he seems to be careful not to cross the limits which the liberals and 
moderate conservatives are eager to protect, and his alignment with the religious right stays, 
in many issues, limited to his speeches. Furthermore, he doesn’t hesitate to differ with 
evangelicals and fundamentalists where he sees fit, as is evident with the various instances 
where he praised Islam. Consequently, as long as his faith is concerned, it seems that he 
carefully tries to avoid being labelled with any denomination or religious group, while at the 
same time aims at satisfying his base with the use of religious rhetoric. Whether he succeeds 
or not, however, is matter of perspective.  
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Conclusion: Modernity vs. America 
If the religious right could sum up all the issues that disturb them and take it to the Supreme 
Court, the trial would probably have a name like this. As we are continuously surprised, and 
even shocked on how the world’s richest democracy can be so religious compared with other 
developed economies, self-identified members of the religious right continue to worry on a 
variety of issues from abortion to gay marriage, from pornography to Bible reading at school. 
At first, it may seem as if they don’t have any considerations on economic issues. Yet they do, 
as when they press for tax reductions. The problem here is that those reductions they so 
ambitiously crave for are in fact against their economic interests. This is precisely what 
Thomas Frank means when he says that “People getting their fundamental interests wrong is 
what American political life is all about” (Frank, 2005: 1). Thus, the primary contradiction of 
the “Great Backlash” is that “it is a working class movement that has done incalculable, 
historic harm to working-class people” (op. cit., p. 6). What they perceive as cultural and 
social degradation is a direct result of laissez-faire capitalism, of modernity- not to mention 
the decline of their economic status. And the anti-liberal rhetoric used by the Republicans 
resonates perfectly with their agony, leading them to reflect their grievances toward an all-
powerful liberal elite, which exists largely in their imagination.  
     Religion here acts as a cohesive factor. It gets people together around a group of 
issues; it gives their somewhat solitary and hollow lives meaning. It makes them volunteer, 
donate, work hard and sweat. And the meaning that had so far escaped them is suddenly 
found. Struggle becomes an end in itself, and the distant dream of a perfect America where 
moral values are respected to the highest degree keeps the struggle going on.  They use the 
tools of modernity with marvellous skill, just in order to get back at modernity. Modern 
evangelicalism and fundamentalism, therefore, tries to put faith at the heart of politics as it 
cries out for lower taxes for the genuine elite who itches on their cultural sorrows. 
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 President Bush, meanwhile, makes perfect use of religious rhetoric to ensure the 
support of his base. This is not to say that he is insincere in his faith: as seen in the episode 
where he tries to quit drinking alcohol, his devotion to Jesus Christ is essential to his life. Yet 
this does not stop him from making political moves that most of the religious right would not 
concur on religious grounds. Nevertheless, his language is perceived by most as one of faith. 
His remarks on the “war between good and evil” and being the “messenger of God” makes 
the evangelicals feel that he is one of them. When it comes to his policy choices, however, 
especially on domestic policy issues where the American nation seems to be divided, he talks 
conservative but does not act nearly at all.  
 The religious right -especially the evangelicals and fundamentalists- and the Bush 
administration seem to be in a state of mutual dependency. In spite of all, evangelicals want to 
see one of them in the White House, and they seem to be content of having him in there. 
Bush, in turn, needs them as a base constituency. Also, he seems to get inspiration from his 
faith, if not direction, and arguably it makes him more confident to have the support of so 
many people with whom his religious language echoes so fittingly. 
 Ultimately, it would be an exaggeration to claim that the rise of religion in America 
has overwhelming effect on politics. After all, evangelicals (including the fundamentalists) 
are still a minority. Yet, a year and a half before the next presidential elections, one can see 
that the issue of faith is gaining importance. At the time of this writing, in June 6th, 2007, at 
02:17 with local time, the CNN International channel broadcasts a special program called 
“Faith and Politics”, where Democrat Primary candidates Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and 
John Edwards answer questions about their faith and how it would affect their politics. The 
host of the show, Soledad O'Brien, explained the nature of the program as one where “the 
candidates’ faith will be put to test.” This is dangerous ground for what is widely seen as 
world’s most advanced nation. Religious right and Bush may not have placed faith at the heart 
of American politics, but it surely stands somewhere in the chest.  
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